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THE RISE OF THE SOVIET
NAVY
In 1960 the Soviet Navy was the second largest in the world in terms
of total tonnage, but in terms of equipment and striking power and in terms
of its ability to conduct sustained operations away from home waters it was
far behind the smaller British and French navies, not to mention the
American. In terms of ship types the Soviet Navy consisted of some 19
cruisers, most of 1948 vintage, 133 destroyer types (including four with
60-100 mile range anti-ship missiles) , and about 196 submarines with
sufficient range to operate on the high seas. Of the latter none were
nuclear powered, and it is estimated that perhaps six of them carried
surface-to-surface missiles in the 350-mile range class. The Navy possessed
a limited capacity for short-haul amphibious operations, with approximately
64 newly constructed landing ships, all but ten of which were under 1000
tons displacement. The Naval Air Force, land based, was being drastically
reduced in size, the decision having been made to transfer all of its
fighter aircraft to the Army Air Force and the Home Defense Air Force. The
Soviet Naval Infantry had been disbanded after World War II.
It is of course difficult to discover the extent of interservice rivalry
within the Soviet military establishment. There is no public equivalent of
the Congressional military appropriations hearings or Department of Defense
re-organization plans which often reveal the relative prestige rankings of
the U.S. armed services. Indicators of the Soviet military "pecking order"
are less direct, but nonetheless are available. Some of the less esoteric
of such signs of prestige or the lack of it are the historical record, the
Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis, 1969).

organization of the Soviet defense establishment, and the statements of
government and party leaders.
The record of history does not add to the prestige of the Soviet Navy.
As a result of the Kronstadt Revolt against the Bolsheviks in 1921 the Navy
labored for many years under that most damning of all stigmata in Soviet
Russia, political unreliability. It had to live with the ghost of its
humiliating defeat by Japan in 1905. Its contribution to the Great
Patriotic War (World War II), while not insignificant, was very definitely
made as a member of the "Army team," making amphibious landings to outflank
the Germans and fighting up and down the great rivers of Russia and Eastern
Europe.
In 1953 the Ministry for the Armed Forces, which had been subdivided in-
to a War Ministry and a Navy Ministry, was abolished. In its place was
formed the Ministry of Defense under which the service branches were organ-
ized according to their combat role: Strategic Rocket Troops, National PVO
(Air Defense), Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Since its in-
ception, the post of Minister of Defense has always been filled by an Army
officer, as have the posts of First Deputy Minister of Defense and First
Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff.
Stalin reportedly had become a "big Navy" advocate by 1950, when he
approved a naval construction plan which would provide for a large surface
2
fleet, thought to include four aircraft carriers. The man who emerged from
the power struggle of 1953-1955 as ruler of the Soviet Union did not share
his predecessor's enthusiasm for a surface Navy. Nikita Khrushchev, revers-
ing a position he had held only a few years previously, announced that the
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might of the Soviet Union was such that resources could be diverted from
military spending into other areas of the economy. Building on the capital
of Sputnik , Khrushchev boasted of the might of the Strategic Rocket Troops,
while carrying out reductions in the personnel of the Armed Forces and
holding the military budget approximately constant from 1956-1961. He
was interested in the strategic nuclear strike potential of submarine-
launched missiles, but publicly relegated large surface vessels to the
status of cruise ships for heads of state in peacetime and "molten coffins"
in war.
A speech by the Minister of Defense commemorating the anniversary of
the founding of the Soviet Armed Forces is an annual ritual in the Soviet
Union. In 1960 the incumbent, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, began with the
phrase "For 42 years the Soviet Army and Navy have stood vigilant guard
3
over the peace of the peoples ..." and went on for 2600 words without
mentioning the Navy again. In concluding a passage warning "imperialist
aggressors" of their fate should they dare to attack, he said "The Soviet
Army '
s
mighty nuclear rocket equipment enables us to guarantee more
securely than ever the defense of the land of the Soviets and other
socialist countries.
Red Army Day and Soviet Navy Day are similar occasions for singing the
praises of the respective services. On Soviet Navy Day 1960 even the
3
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Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, felt
constrained to speak of his service in a distinctly secondary role.
"Rocket troops, which have the greatest firepower, now form the chief
branch of our Armed Forces," said the Admiral, who then turned to naval
matters by noting that present day military operations can be conducted
only with the cooperation of all branches of the service. "Large fighting
ships and aircraft carriers . . . now represent the yesterday of navies,"
said Gorshkov, prudently following Khrushchev's lead "It is correctly
believed in advanced military thought that the navy that best meets the
requirements of modern warfare must be basically a submarine navy. It is
in this direction that the Navy of the Soviet Union is now developing."
There are indications that Admiral Gorshkov was not at this time in
the first tier of senior Soviet military officials. As a Candidate Member
of the Communist Party Central Committee he was in the outer group of high
party officialdom; other service chiefs, including his predecessor, had
been full members. Gorshkov reached his fiftieth birthday in 1960, and was
awarded the Order of Lenin on that occasion. The brief official announce-
ment of this event appears quite perfunctory and does not even mention his
naval service, simply noting "... Order of Lenin to Comrade Sergei
Georgiyevich Gorshkov on his fiftieth birthday for services to the Soviet
State."
7
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The Navy was in a backwater operationally as well. As might be ex-
pected of a Navy whose value was determined by what assistance it could
render to the Army, the Soviet Navy remained almost exclusively in the
waters bordering the Soviet Union. Out-of-area operations were largely
limited to those dictated by logistic necessity: annual transfers of units
between the Northern and Baltic Fleets, and between the Northern and Pacific
Fleets, via the isolated northern route skirting the Siberian coast. This
activity, plus perhaps one or two "show the flag" visits annually to foreign
ports in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic constituted Soviet open-ocean
naval operations. These operations "... left the impression that the
Soviets felt somewhat uncomfortable outside the waters of their own fleet
o
areas." Indicative of the stay-at-home nature of the Soviet Navy during
this period is the fact that when the cruiser DZERZHINSKI logged 13,000
steaming miles during 1961 this was hailed as a considerable feat in Soviet
9
circles. In the same vein, an article in Izvestia reported somewhat wist-
fully 'the dream of all atomic submarine commanders—a voyage around the
,10
world underwater.
The first significant out-of-area Soviet naval exercise was conducted
during the summer of 1961, when a brief, simple operation involving a small
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number of surface combatants, support ships, and four submarines took place
in the Norwegian Sea. In this same year there were several significant
events in Soviet naval construction. Perhaps reflecting the announced in-
crease of 30 per cent in the Soviet military budget, conversion of the gun
cruiser DZERZHINSKI was begun, marking the first Soviet efforts to provide
a seagoing anti-air missile capability. In April the first of the KYNDA
class missile cruisers was launched. This was the first of the modern
Soviet cruisers emphasizing missile armament. Early units of the later
well-known STYX missile fast patrol boats—the OSA and the KOMAR class
—
joined the Soviet fleet, as did (according to Soviet sources—Western
observers did not view one until 1963) the first Soviet nuclear powered
submarine, the "N" class. In the summer the Soviet naval presence in the
Mediterranean was severely reduced when the squadron based at Saseno,
Albania, was withdrawn as the result of strained Soviet-Albanian relations
stemming from the latter' s position in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.
The end of 1961 saw an upsurge in the political standing of the Navy, as
both Admiral Gorshkov and his First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral
Vitalii Fokin, were elevated to full membership status in the Central
Committee.
For the Soviet Navy, and, indeed, for most of the world, the most
significant event of 1962 was the Cuban Missile Crisis. It demonstrated
in striking fashion the Achilles heel of the military posture adopted by
the Soviet Union under Khrushchev: lacking mobile conventional forces the
Russians had no options between the rapid retreat which they chose and the
strategic nuclear attack which they rationally avoided. The Soviet Navy,
its deployed forces consisting entirely of submarines, was unable to act

in support of Soviet foreign policy. The submarine, because of the very-
invisibility which makes it such an effective "hot war" weapon, is a poor
means by which to express firm national commitment in a "cold war" situa-
tion. Khrushchev was forced to threaten American missile bases in Turkey
because he could not support his own in Cuba. The subsequent construction
of modern surface vessels and their deployment to overseas areas of
importance to the Soviets indicates their increased appreciation of the
role which sea power may play in support of foreign policy.
The naval construction effort during 1962 saw construction begin on
the lead ship of ten KASHIN class guided missile destroyers, the first
major Soviet warships to incorporate the advantages (rapid acceleration,
ease of maintenance, and increased operational readiness) of gas turbine
propulsion. In contrast, the U.S. Navy will not have its first naval com-
batant of this nature in operation until 1974, when the first of the
SPRUANCE class destroyers is scheduled for delivery. Of significance to
the Soviet Navy's strategic posture, the last of thirty "G" class ballistic
missile submarines was completed. This class, the first to be built speci-
fically to deliver ballistic missiles, first appeared in 1960, and was then
capable of carrying three 350-mile range SARK missiles, each mounting a
one megaton nuclear warhead; it was at that time required to surface at
least partially in order to launch the missiles but it is undoubtedly now
fitted with later models which can be launched from complete submergence,
and have longer range as well.
Operationally, the summer of 1962 saw the first Black Sea Fleet to
Northern Fleet transfer take place. In July, four surface combatants, a
number of support ships , and more than twenty submarines conducted an

8exercise which included Naval Air Force participation in the area between
Norway's North Cape and the Iceland-Faeroes Gap (the ocean area lying be-
tween Iceland and Norway's Faeroe Island group). Western evidence to sup-
port the claim is inconclusive, but the Soviets stated that a "N" class
nuclear submarine conducted exercises under the northern icepack, including
a North Pole transit, during this period.
Evidence began to appear in 1962 that concepts of the Navy's mission
were changing within the Soviet military establishment. Breaking an ex-
tended silence in Soviet military writing of a serious nature, Marshal of
the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky and an unnamed group of senior Soviet
officers published the book Military Strategy . This volume was unflatter-
ing to the Soviet Navy in a number of ways, not the least of which being
the fact that no naval officers were asked to contribute to this, a study
of the entire spectrum of modern warfare. However, the book reveals that
even among Army officers it was conceded that support of the Red Army was
no longer the primary mission of the Soviet Navy. The Sokolovsky group
indicated that the primary mission of the Navy in general war was to seek
out and destroy Western attack carrier striking groups and Polaris sub-
12
marines "... far beyond the confines of Soviet waters." In carrying
out this mission of the Navy would rely heavily on "nuclear rockets" and
especially submarines. It was also indicated that destruction of enemy
logistic shipping would be an important task of the Navy, and, although not
specifically discussed, it was strongly implied that there would be need
of a major sealift capability, since in the authors' view of nuclear war
actual invasion of the enemy's territory would be necessary to assure
victory. There was no mention of how the Navy might be used in conflict
situations below the level of general war.
Breyer, op. cit
., pp. 157, 286.
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A new tone appeared in the Armed Forces anniversary speech as well:
Our country's submarine fleet is equipped with various types
of missiles that can destroy enemy ships hundreds of kilometers
distant from the shores of the socialist camp and that can reduce
the enemy's naval and land bases to dust. Nor will submarines
equipped with Polaris missiles ... be spared destruction.
The Soviet Army and Navy are now equipped with quantities of
missiles and nuclear weapons . . . sufficient to wipe out any
aggressor . . ."
Late in the same year, a statement by Admiral Gorshkov first made
reference to another facet of the Navy's mission, one which would seem to
imply a recognition of the foreign policy aspects of naval strategy: "The
Soviet Navy, by the character of her armament of highly manueverable forces
and military capabilities, is obliged to be prepared at any moment and at
any point of the globe to secure the protection of the interests of our
state." The phrase 'protection of state interests' has appeared on
several occasions since 1962, both in Gorshkov 's writings and in Navy Day
newspaper editorials, and appears from its context on subsequent occasions
to be a concept distinct from defense of the Soviet state as such. In
1963, for example, Gorshkov wrote:
The Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying
wise foresight, taking all measures to insure that the armament
and organization of our fleet correspond to its growing role in
the defense of the country, and in the protection of its state
interests. -*
That this concept was considered to be applicable in peacetime was later
indicated, as Gorshkov stated in 1967 that the role of the Navy included
support of "state interests at sea in peacetime."
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Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius, "The Soviet Navy," speech
delivered before the Retired Flag and General Officer Symposium, Washington
D.C., March 29, 1968. Vital Speeches , XXIV (June 1, 1968), 482-484.

10
In 1962 Admiral Gorshkov assumed the rank of Fleet Admiral, although
this was apparently not a promotion but an administrative measure "...
for the purpose of bringing the military ranks of the USSR Navy into full
correspondence with the military ranks of the Soviet Army ..." He was
also designated a Deputy Minister of Defense, as were the Commander-in-
Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops, the PVO and the Air Force.
In 1963 the first of what has since become a pattern of bi-annual
Soviet fleet exercises was conducted. In March and April a surface exer-
cise was conducted near Norway's Lofoten Islands, and in August a similar
exercise took place in the Iceland-Faeroes Gap, the area which Soviet sub-
marines of the Northern Fleet would be likely to transit in wartime to
reach the Atlantic shipping lanes. Politically, there were further indi-
cations that the Soviet Navy's position within the military hierarchy was
still improving: After Admiral Fokin died, Gorshkov 's signature to the
offical obituary appeared directly following the signatures of the First
Deputy Secretaries of Defense, and above that of any other Service chief.
That this was not merely in deference to the fact that the deceased was a
close comrade is indicated by the fact that when Marshal Malinovsky,
Minister of Defense, died in 1967, Admiral Gorshkov' s signature again
18
appeared in the same relative position ahead of the other service leaders.
Admiral Fokin 's duties were assumed by Admiral V. A. Kasatonov.
Three significant events in the growth of the Soviet submarine force
occurred in 1963. Soviet builders completed both the first Soviet
Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On Establishing







submarine designed from the outset to have anti-ship missiles as its
primary weapon, and the first of their nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarines. The former, lead ship of the "J" class, is the latest known
type of conventionally powered Soviet submarine, and carries four SHADDOCK
radio-guided missiles. These missiles have a 450 mile range and may be
fitted with either a high explosive or a nuclear warhead. The ballistic
missile submarine, first of the "H" class, was a follow-on version of the
conventionally-powered "G" class, and was armed with the same missies. An
indication of the rapid pace of Soviet submarine development is given by
the fact that the first of the "E" class submarines, successors to the "J"
class and in fact laid down a year later than the "J" prototype, was also
completed in 1963. This class, which combines the advantages of nuclear
propulsion with an increased SHADDOCK missile carrying capacity, would
appear to be the type which the Soviets are relying on to destroy the
Western attack carrier striking groups. As of early 1970 a total of 25
of this class had been built.
Western discussions of the possibility of a NATO Multilateral Nuclear
Force in 1963 touched a sensitive Soviet nerve: the question of West
German access to nuclear weapons. Although the proposal, which would have
placed at sea a fleet of nuclear rocket-launching surface vessels manned
by multinational NATO crews but with control of the nuclear warheads
retained by the U.S., never gained full acceptance within the American
government and encountered wide skepticism among most of the other NATO
nations, the Soviets attacked it loudly. This renewed emphasis on the NATO
naval threat could not have hurt the Soviet Navy's expansion program. This




the Soviet Navy to bring these "pirate ships" to justice.
In 1964 the Soviet Naval Infantry (marine corps) was resurrected in
20
what was for the Soviets a blast of publicity. This force, which has
grown steadily since its rebirth, is advertised by the Soviets as an elite
shock unit. In prose worthy of John Wayne's press agent, the Moscow
Domestic Service has reported:
Attack is the marines' element. . . . It is a great
honor for our youth to be a marine ... he can swim,
dive, run, cut barbed wire, blow up boats, fight a tank
singlehanded, manage in any situation, and independently
make decisions. If he is surrounded by the enemy, the
marine fights to his last breath—this is the unwritten
law of the marines. 21
By 1970 this force had grown to seven brigades, organized into 500 man
battalions which cruised with the Soviet Fleet in amphibious landing
22 23
ships. In 1971 the marines were believed to number about 15,000 men.
The growing confidence of the Soviet Navy was apparent in the state-
ments of Admiral Gorshkov and other senior officers in 1964. Said the
Commander-in-Chief, "For the Soviet Navy, 1964 is the year of the routine
long cruise." On Navy Day, Vice Admiral Grishanov was moved to remark
19
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"Sailors are grateful to their beloved Communist Party
for the great attention that has been paid to the Navy.
Our Party's Central Committee and N. S. Khrushchev per-
sonally are attentively following the development of our
Navy. "24
Gone was the 1960 deference to the Strategic Rocket Troops. Said
Grishanov: "... the long-range rockets of our submarines can strike
with high-power nuclear warheads not only groupings of the enemy's naval
forces but even targets deep in the aggressor's home territory."
Apparently gone as well was the exclusive role of the submarine as the
only acceptable weapon of modern naval warfare, although it was still
clearly regarded as dominant:
In addition to submarines, the homeland has given the
fleet the latest surface rocket-launching vessels and
rocket-firing planes, which become one of the basic forces
of the Navy.
At the Marti Shipyard in the Black Sea Port of Nicolaev, Soviet work-
men began construction of what was to become the first Soviet venture into
shipborne naval aviation: the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cruiser MOSKVA.
It is not at all certain that Soviet strategists had fully embraced this
concept as early as 1964. There is evidence to indicate that both MOSKVA
and her sister ship LENINGRAD were originally laid down to fill orders
placed by Indonesia, but were not delivered because Moscow and Djakarta
25




July 26, 1964, p. 1. As Chief of the Political Directorate
of the Navy, Grishanov could of course be expected to laud the role of the
Party in his Navy Day statement, however, since he could have done so with-
out indicating such satisfaction with the Navy's fortunes, the air of






That the Soviets were at least nibbling at the edges of the concept
of ship-helicopter partnership, however, is indicated by the commencement
of construction on
v
the KRESTA class guided missile cruisers in 1964. These
impressive ships, armed with a mix of SHADDOCK anti-ship missiles and
GOA anti-aircraft missiles, the latter with a range of nine to twelve miles,
incorporate the weapons systems of the earlier KYNDA class missile ships and
the gas turbine propulsion of the KASHIN class, and include a helicopter
hanger and flight deck adequate to service one or perhaps two helos.
Activity was the hallmark of Soviet naval affairs in 1964 as Soviet
ships called at more foreign ports than in the preceding five years com-
bined, visiting Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Morocco,
and Senegal. The Mediterranean squadron was reestablished on a con-
tinuing basis, and NATO observers noted that Soviet naval exercises, of
which four were conducted, "revealed more imagination and enthusiasm" than
26
ever before. In the spring of that year, Western observers gained their
first glimpse of a KASHIN class destroyer, as it transited the Turkish
Straits enroute to the Mediterranean. Pacific Fleet units began to make
27their first, sporadic appearances in the Philippine Sea.
Krushchev's fall from power, in October of that year, appears to have
had no immediate repercussions within the Soviet Navy.
Nineteen sixty-five was a relatively uneventful year for the Soviet
Navy. Rear Admiral G. F. Stepanov visited Massawa, Ethiopia, aboard the
destroyer NAPORISTYI in February. In the spring a small force conducted









a group of thirty surface combatants plus support ships and an unknown
number of submarines conducted a full-ranging operation in the area from
the Iceland-Faeroes Gap to North Cape. The Mediterranean squadron in-
creased slightly in size but conducted no major exercises and confined
its activities to the eastern half of the sea. Soviet naval units made
their first visit to Egypt when they called at Port Said in September.
The process of upgrading the Navy continued, as Admiral Kasatonov was
promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.
On Navy Day 1965, Admiral Gorshkov indicated that the Soviet naval
buildup was tailored to produce a force which could defeat the U.S. Navy,
which he described as having a "special role" in the "military prepara-
tions of the American imperialists and their proteges." He said in refer-
ence to the Soviet Navy, "In the past few decades its development—the
profound qualitative changes in its armaments and its equipment with new
28
ships—has been subordinated to this goal."
The pattern established the pattern established the previous year of
calling at Egyptian ports was continued and expanded in 1966. In March
a Soviet guided missile destroyer, a frigate, two submarines, and a depot
ship called at Port Said for a five day visit. In July Egyptian units
returned the call, visiting the Black Sea port of Sevastopol. An addi-
29
tional group of Soviet naval ships made port at Alexandria in August.
Other non bloc port calls were made at Massawa in January and Toulon,
France, in November.
In May a Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister
Gromyko traveled to Cairo for nine days of talks concerning "urgent
28
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problems of the international system that are of mutual interest." The
only high military official to accompany them was Fleet Admiral Gorshkov,
a probable indication not only of the importance of the Navy to Soviet
foreign policy in the Middle East, but of Gorshkov 's increased personal
standing in the hierarchy as well.
The Soviets continued to emphasize the expanded nature of their Navy's
operations in 1966 and to phrase this in such a way as to imply that such
activities represented evidence of a Western naval decline. In the words of
First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Kasatonov:
The USSR Navy flag can be seen in all parts of the world's
oceans. The aim of these trips is to support the national
interests of the Soviet Union. At present, our ships are
undergoing naval training in parts of the world's oceans which
earlier used to be considered the traditional preserve of the
British and American navies. 31
The spring basic training exercise, conducted in previous years in the
vicinity of North Cape, was in 1966 held in the Iceland-Faeroes Gap. Patrol
and surveillance operations were conducted in the area to the north and
northeast of the British Isles, in the waters once plied by Rodney and
Jellicoe in the heyday of the British Grand Fleet. Similar operations were
conducted in the Norwegian Sea. A fleet exercise was held near North Cape.
In the Mediterranean, the slow buildup of the Soviet squadron continued,
and in the Leningrad shipyard the first of the formidable KRESTA class
missile cruisers slid down the ways.
In an operation which was probably timed to coincide with the opening
of the Soviet Twenty-Third Party Congress, a group of Soviet submarines
reportedly made a voyage around the world without surfacing between late
30
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February and early April. This event, which Admiral Gorshkov proudly
noted "... bespeaks the enormous potential of our fleet," was first
announced by the Minister of Defense in the course of his major speech be-
fore the Congress. When the new Central Committee was announced, two
Admirals were among the total of seven military men elected to Candidate =
status, joining the commanders of the five largest military districts in
33
the Soviet Union in receiving this honor.
In June 1967 the Six-Day War suddenly thrust the Soviet and American
navies together in a crisis area for the first time. The main Soviet and
U.S. groups remained separated, but mounted a tense and increased
surveillance of each other. The tension was heightened by the rapid
emergence of world speculation that the U.S. might feel impelled to inter-
vene militarily in support of its commitment to Israeli survival, and if
so, the likely instrument of this intervention would be aircraft from the
two attack carriers then in the Sixth Fleet.
The presence of the Soviet force, though not sufficient in striking
power to counterbalance the Sixth Fleet militarily, had political effect.
For the first time an American President had to include in his crisis
calculations that the Soviet Union had the capability to take local
military action against U.S. interests in a crisis area not bordering on
the Soviet Union. It is extremely unlikely that President Johnson ever
seriously considered taking military action to support Israel in this in-
stance, but had the situation been otherwise the fact that for the first
time the Russians could do something more credible than threaten to use
32
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ICBMs in response would have greatly increased the risk involved in either
a Lebanon- type landing or air strike.
It also increased the danger of an accidental superpower clash. When
word was recieved in Washington of the attack upon the American intelligence
ship LIBERTY, the first reaction of the Secretary of Defense, sustained for
about half an hour until further information had been received, was that
34
the Russians had done it. Fortunately this was not a reaction shared by
the commander of the Sixth Fleet, who dispatched aircraft to aid the
stricken vessel within minutes but made no move toward the Soviets. The
course of the aircraft took them in the direction of the battle area,
raising the possibility that the Soviet government might interpret this in-
formation as the beginning of U.S. intervention when it was reported by
Soviet vessels shadowing the U.S. carrier AMERICA. To forestall this the
White House sent a hurried message to the Russians via the hotline. Part
of the Soviet reaction to the war was to augment their Mediterranean
squadron while loudly proclaiming their support for the Arabs. They were
careful, however, not to introduce naval units into the combat zone until
the geographic limits of Israel's ambitions were clear. Only when it was
obvious that the Israelis were going no farther than Suez did Soviet ships
enter Egyptian ports again. Within these cautious limits however, the
Soviets were making use of their Navy to demonstrate military support for
a political commitment, the first time they had done so. Naval 'protection
of state interests' had become a reality.
As expected, the combination of political rhetoric and visible naval
power returned handsome dividends in increased Soviet prestige among the
34
Jonathan Trumbull Howe, Multicrises (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p.




Arabs. One of the many concrete military results of the Soviet policy of
support for the Arabs was the granting of base privileges at Alexandria and
35
Port Said, Egypt, and Latakia, Syria to the Soviet Navy.
In October a more dramatic watershed occurred, one which was to pro-
foundly upgrade the image of the Soviet Navy's combat potential in the eyes
of their Western counterparts: The Israeli destroyer EILAT was sunk by STYX
missies fired from one of the Soviet OSA class patrol boats which had been
Oil
supplied to the Egyptians. This, the first combat use of anti-ship
missies in the history of naval warfare, involved a short-range, relatively
primitive Soviet missile. The existence of more sophisticated, longer-range
anti-ship missiles on large number of Soviet submarines and on major surface
units took on increased significance.
Although the exact timing was undoubtedly coincidental, within a few
days after ELIAT was sunk, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov was elevated by the
Presidium to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, a pro-
motion which made him the equal of a Marshal of the Soviet Union and
clearly indicated not only his entrance into the top of the military
hierarchy, but continuing high level satisfaction with the performance of
the Navy.
The use of Soviet naval forces to inhibit the operational freedom of
the U.S. Navy was apparent in the Pacific as well as the Mediterranean in
35
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1967. During the summer an American task force, including one carrier,
conducted anti-submarine warfare training in the Sea of Japan was kept un-
der constant surveillance by Soviet Pacific Fleet units. In addition to
observing American operations the Soviet harassed the force by manuevering
their vessels in such a manner as to disrupt the U.S. exercises, even to
the point of causing two minor collisions. The message was clear: keep
out of the Sea of Japan.
In 1967 the first Soviet naval vessel with a significant capability
to conduct amphibious landing operations was seen by the West. This type,
known as the ALLIGATOR class, and four time larger than any previous Soviet
landing ship, is similar to the American Landing Ship Tank (LST) of World
War II fame and is capable of carrying a complete Naval Infantry battalion
and its equipment. Eight of this class were to be in service by 1971.
Soviet Fleet exercises during 1967 included a large battle problem
conducted in the area between Norway and Iceland, plus ASW exercises off
North Cape and in the Iceland- Faeroes Gap. In addition to frequenting
Egyptian and Syrian ports between June and October, Soviet groups visited
Stockholm and Massawa, this latter visit enhanced by the presence of Fleet
Admiral Gorshkov himself.
In February 1968, the American intelligence collection ship USS
PUEBLO was seized by the Peoples ' Republic of Korea, resulting in another
Soviet-American naval presence situation in a crisis area. In this case
though, it was reasonably clear from the statements of the American
government prior to the arrival of the U.S. force in the Sea of Japan that
military action was not contemplated as an American response. Soviet
leaders probably evaluated the risk of a military superpower confrontation

21
as acceptable when balanced against the tremendous opportunity which the
situation offered to steal a march on the Chinese Communists in their
contest for leadership of the "camp of socialism." Soviet destroyers moved
boldly into the near vicinity of the American carrier while other units




This concrete step, in comparison with nothing more menacing then
rhetoric from the Chinese People's Republic, was a powerful rejoinder to
the latter 's contention that the "Soviet renegade revisionist clique" no
longer had the stomach for revolutionary struggle. The Soviets did, how-
ever, stop short of an additional step probably open to them: sending
Soviet ships to "visit" Wonsan, where the PUEBLO was held, or other North
Korean ports.
In the spring of 1968 the Soviet Navy conducted a small exercise to
the southeast of the Faeroe Islands, and harrassed a NATO naval force
conducting operations off the Norwegian coast, although in this instance
no collisions were reported. From July 11-19 the navies of the Soviet
Union, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic exercise SEVER ("North"),
which was both the first significant naval exercise of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) and the most complex naval operation undertaken to that
time by the Soviet Navy. Whether this was one portion of a general "tune-
up" of WTO forces to perfect the techniques of joint operations under Soviet
control before the plunge into Czechoslovakia can only be speculated, since
it is not known in the West when that decision was made. The exercise began
37
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Soviet Sea Power
,
(Washington: 1969), p. 65.

22
with an "Eastern Group" attempting to locate and destroy a "Western Group"
of surface ships and submarines moving north between Norway and Iceland.
The climax of the exercise occurred when troops of the three nations
O Q
stormed ashore in an amphibious landing operation on the Polish coast.
The Mediterranean squadron continued the accelerated growth pattern
which appeared in 1967, reaching a strength of some 61 vessels, including
the ASW cruiser MOSKVA, which was first seen by Western observers at this
39
time. In a major extension of Soviet influence, ships of the Northern,
Baltic, and Pacific Fleets began operations in the Indian Ocean. In
October a force of destroyers, submarines, and support vessels departed
European waters on a journey southward around the tip of Africa to join
their countrymen, who had previously steamed southwestward from Vladivostok
through the South China Sea (remaining well clear of the Tonkin Gulf where
U.S. Navy carriers were conducting air strikes against "fraternal socialist"
North Vietnam) to enter the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca.
The European group, which included some non-military space event tracking
and recovery vessels, called at Casablanca, Dar-es-Salaam, and Aden. From
mid-December until the following March about 25 to 30 Soviet naval and
merchant vessels remained in the vicinity of the remote Seychelles Islands,
40
a tiny remnant of the British Empire northeast of Madagascar. In a flurry
of "showing the flag" Soviet naval units made port visits to Yemen, the
People's Republic of Southern Yemen, Pakistan, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, India,
38









Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia during 1968.
In Cuba, Soviet preparation to provide support for their vessels in
the Western hemisphere were completed by the end of 1968. During the
course of the year facilities for servicing large numbers of ships were
completed in Havana, including a floating dock, repair shops, and a com-
41
munications station.
The Soviet intent to stake a claim to the Indian Ocean area was even
more in evidence in 1969, when naval vessels called at ports in the People's
Republic of Southern Yemen, Kenya, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and
Tanzania. A flotilla enroute to the area from European waters visited
Guinea and Nigeria. In July, ships of the Soviet Navy made their first
overt penetration of the Carribean, after choosing a somewhat less than
direct transit route from European waters which took them down the Atlantic
coast of the U.S. Besides calling at Cuban ports, vessels of this group,
which included the Soviets' most modern missile ships, visited Barbados
and French Martinique in the Lesser Antilles, to the north of Venezuela.
The Soviet Navy was active in European waters as well. Two large-
scale exchanges of ships took place between the Northern Fleet and the
Mediterranean squadron, the first such exchange to be accomplished. Large-
scale ASW exercises were held in the Norwegian Sea, and additional exercises
were conducted in the North Sea between the British Isles and Denmark as
well as far to the north of Iceland near the fringe of the polar icecap. The
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During this period of high Soviet naval visibility NATO forces gained
their first glimpses of two new Soviet nuclear submarine classes. The
most important of vthese was the "Y" class, which is the Russian equivalent
of the American POLARIS submarine. It carries sixteen ballistic missies
equipped with nuclear warheads, underwater-launched and capable of an
estimated 1500 mile range. This represented a significant increase in the
strategic nuclear role of the Navy, in terms of both range and firepower.
In addition, the ability to launch the attack from complete submergence
provided an increased immunity from detection prior to missile firing. The
remaining debutante was a second-generation, high speed (estimated at 30
nautical miles per hour) nuclear model carrying eight of the familiar
SHADDOCK missies. 43
During April the North Koreans once again initiated a crisis in the
Sea of Japan in which the naval forces of the super powers were to become
involved. Aircraft from North Korea attacked and shot down an American
Navy electronic surveillance aircraft, which crashed in international waters
not far south of the major Soviet Pacific Fleet base at Vladivostok. The
American reaction was both more circumspect and more menacing than that of
the previous year: Official statements did not rule out military action
against North Korea, and the American naval forces dispatched to the scene
was the largest to be assembled since World War II. The Soviets too reacted
differently, adopting a low profile strategy, remaining well away from the
American carriers with combat ships, and "assisting" on an ad hoc basis
with the search for survivors. Although this "assistance" was viewed in
43
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some quarters as a fine example of behavior in the best sea-going tradition
of aid to those in distress, it should be noted that the Russians were well
aware from American statements of the nature of the aircraft and the fact
that it had carried large amounts of highly classified equipment—some of
which just might float. Whatever else they may have found, the Soviets
did recover some human remains , which they duly turned over to an American
ship after a high seas rendezvous.
The relatively cautious Soviet policy in this crisis was probably due
to three factors. Of greatest importance was the Soviet desire to avoid
straining relations with the U.S. at a time when they were apparently quite
anxious to maintain a negotiating atmosphere in view of the pending treaty
prohibiting offensive weapons from the seabed, the incompletely ratified
nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and conversations on the convening of arms
limitation talks. Of secondary importance was probably the desire to
demonstrate to Kim Il-Sung, whose foreign policy had become one of extreme
virulence toward the U.S. even by Communist standards, that he had not been
granted cart blanche to involve the Soviet Union in confrontations with the
U.S. Uncertainty as to American and North Korean intentions was certainly
a factor in the Soviet's caution as well, as they would have found them-
selves in in a touchy position if an American naval force with Soviet naval
ships in attendance suddenly became embroiled in combat with the Koreans.
The global reverberations of Soviet naval power continued and grew
louder in 1970. In March, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov accepted the invitation
of his Algerian counterpart for an eight day visit. In April, the month
of the one hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth, the Admiral's forces
outdid themselves, staging a worldwide exercise which the Soviet press
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unabashedly compared to the voyage of the Great White Fleet, which had
announced America's arrival as a great naval power at the turn of the
century. Said Admiral Gorshkov: "It is difficult to find an area on the
44
map of the world where ships of the Soviet Navy cannot sail."
During Exercise OKEAN ("Ocean") , which appears to have lasted from
April 16 to April 30, Soviet forces conducted operations across the full
spectrum of naval capabilities (excluding of course carrier operations)
,
and seemed to give particular attention to sustaining a high tempo of
activity by providing logistic support at sea. In the past the Soviets
have refueled and re-supplied largely in sheltered anchorages . Fifteen
ships exercised in the Philippine Sea, 32 elsewhere in the Pacific, 45 in
the Mediterranean, 18 in the Indian Ocean, and 103 in the Atlantic.
Amphibious landings were conducted along the Soviet coast in the Sea of
Japan, and from the Barents Sea near Murmansk, this latter operation
witnessed by Minister of Defense Grechko and Admiral Gorshkov. Consider-
able publicity attended the launching of a missile from a nuclear sub-
marine. When the exercise was completed the participants fanned out to
call at ports throughout the world.
Commenting on Exercise OKEAN in 1971, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov'
s
American counterpart called it " . . . the widest in scope conducted by
any post World War II Navy," and "... a positive indication of (a) a
growing Soviet sophistication in naval planning and conduct of worldwide
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operations, (b) existence of a capable command and control organization.
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On April 23 Soviet naval prowess intruded more significantly on the
American consciousness when the Department of Defense matter-of-factly
announced that a Soviet POLARIS submarine ("Y" class) was at that time on
station off the East coast, and that it or others like it had been operating
there for several months.
In July the government of Mauritius , a tiny island nation in the Indian
Ocean some 700 miles east of Madagascar, announced the signing of an agree-
ment which would permit Soviet fishing vessels to call there, and for Soviet
aircraft to fly in supplies and equipment for the craft. The Mauritian
Prime Minister, speaking in London, specifically denied that the Soviet Union
would be allowed to establish a naval base in Mauritius under this agreement,
however, speculation to the contrary was widespread. The Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean continued unabated; from 1968 through 1970 the
Soviets maintained an average of 14 naval vessels there, with the total
once reaching 30.
Late in 1970 it was reported by the Western press that the Soviets
had established a military base on the island of Socotra, which is at the
entrance to the Gulf of Aden and could be used to control entrance to and
47
exit from the Red Sea. It would also dominate the southern route to and
from the Suez canal when re-opened. Socotra, 70 miles long and 20 miles
wide, contains three airstrips, each of which could be expanded to accomo-
date modern jet aircraft. Although it has no natural harbor, construction
of a breakwater could provide a man-made port. The property of the People's
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Republic of Yemen (Southern Yemen) , the island is said to have been used
by the Soviets for training in amphibious landing techniques, and to con-
48
tain a Soviet communication station. The Soviets and Yemenis have denied
the truth of these reports, which have appeared in both British and
American press.
A report issued by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in
April, 1971, stated that the Soviets were digging massive tunnels on
49
Socotra and constructing a Gibralter-like fortress there.
In late August a Soviet "fishing trawler" was an uninvited guest at
the premier submarine-launched test firing of the POSEIDON missile, suc-
cessor to POLARIS . In a display which typified the blunt manner in which
the Soviet Union uses sea power, this vessel engaged American recovery
forces in a race for debris from the missile's protective covering. After
shouldering its way in front of the intended American recovery ship, forcing
the latter to reverse its engines to avoid collision, the "trawler" was
finally thwarted by the actions of the destroyer escort USS CALCATERRA,
which apparently threatened to run it down in turn. American newspaper
readers were treated to a picture of the CALCATERRA and the "trawler" in
apparent imminent danger of collision.
On the ninth of September a group of Soviet naval ships entered the
Cuban port of Cienfuegos and moored, thus participating a colloquoy be-
tween the American and Soviet governments which the former remains notably
reluctant to discuss. The Russian flotilla included a two modern missile
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ships, an oil tanker, a submarine tender, and an ALLIGATOR class amphibious
landing ship. On the deck of the landing ship were some large barges,
which were identified by State Department intelligence officials, viewing
aerial photos of Cienfuegos, as being of the distinctive type used to
receive radioactive effluents from nuclear submarines. First public
notice of this activity was given on September 25th, when the U.S. govern-
ment announced the Presence of the ships, and Defense Department officials
stated that it appeared that the Soviets intended to construct naval
facilities in Cienfuegos.
Soon after the initial announcement the Department of State made clear
that a statement made by President John Kennedy in 1962 was still repre-
sentative of current policy, a statement to the effect that so long as no
offensive weapons are introduced into Cuba there would be peace in the
Caribbean. White House press officials stated that should the Soviets
construct a base for servicing "nuclear-armed" Soviet vessels in Cuba it
would be regarded as a violation of the understandings reached in 1962 with
respect to nuclear missiles in Cuba.
On October 9th the Soviet Union issued a statement rejecting the
reports of its activities as base construction and stating that the USSR
was honoring the Kennedy agreement. On October 13th the submarine tender,
accompanied by a tugboat, left Cienfuegos. This same day TASS, the Soviet
news agency, issued the following statement: "The Soviet Union has not
built and is not building its own military base in Cuba and is not doing
anything which would contradict the understanding between the governments
of the USSR and the U.S."
Benjamin Welles, "Foreign Policy: Nixon Dissatisfied With Size and
Cost of Intelligence Setup," New York Times, January 15, 1970.
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The submarine tender returned to Cienfuegos on October 31st and re-
mained there until early January, 1971. It appears that during this time
period the Soviets proceeded with the construction of naval facilities on
an island in Cienfuegos harbor and elsewhere in the vicinity. The special
barges remained anchored in the harbor. When the tender departed
Cienfuegos in early January it left behind extensive facilities for the
repair and servicing of nuclear submarines, largely unmanned, but capable
of being made fully operational in a short time. It has been reported that
later in January these facilities were in fact used to provide support for
a conventionally powered submarine which called repeatedly at Cienfuegos.
Throughout this period there was little official comment on what, if
any, conversations were taking place between the respective governments
with regard to the situation, although in mid-November the State Department
announced that the Soviet Union had given "private assurance" that it would
not introduce offensive weapons anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. At a
news conference on December 21 the Secretary of State reiterated the U.S.
position that the servicing of nuclear-armed Soviet vessels "in or from"
Cuban ports would be a violation of the 1962 understandings on Cuba.
At the end of 1971 it appeared that arrangements with Egypt had
significantly strengthened the Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean.
The Soviet Union reportedly has air bases at Aswan, Inshas , Mansura, Beni
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Suef, Glyan Klis, and a location west of Cairo. An estimated 150-170
Soviet pilots man the fighters and fighter-bombers which operate from these
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bases. In addition some ten TU-16 BADGER medium-range bombers with
Egyptian markings are reportedly flown by Russian pilots on regular
53
surveillance missions over the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Although it is likely
that the primary Soviet motive for deploying these forces was to defend
Egypt against the deep Israeli air strikes which threatened to undermine the
Nasser regime in 1970, they also represent a partial solution to the
critical lack of air cover for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron should
there be a confrontation with the U.S. Navy. This increases the credibility
of the Soviet force as a political counterweight to the carrier-armed
Sixth Fleet.
In addition the Soviet Navy makes use of port facilities at Alexandria
and Mersa Matruh. Diplomatic sources in London were cited in the press to
the effect that the latter port is entirely under Soviet control, off-
limits even to Egyptian officials, and is underoing extensive construction
54
to provide repair and refueling facilities, to be completed by mid-1972.
New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger reported after an interview with
President Anwar Sadat that the Egyptian leader has promised to continue
giving the Soviets the use of naval facilities in his country even after a
possible settlement of the conflict with Israel.
Besides the military facilities which the Russians have been building
for themselves in Egypt they are attempting to obtain the use of several
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bases in other areas from which the United States or its European allies
have been required to withdraw: Mers-el-Kebir , a former French naval base
in Algeria; Wheelus Field, a former U.S. Air Force base in Libya; and most
recently, the facilities of Malta, from which British forces, NATO, and the
Sixth Fleet have been required to depart. All this of course represents a
quiet reversal of the policy toward overseas bases loudly advanced by the
Soviet Union since it renounced its Finnish naval base in 1955, that they
were the trappings of imperialism and as such were anathema to "the forces
of peace and socialism."

CHAPTER II
THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE
The Soviet Merchant Marine expanded greatly in size and coverage of
the world's trade routes between 1960 and 1970, and its aggregate dead-
weight tonnage (dwt) increased by 116 per cent. In 1960 this fleet pos-
sessed some 873 ocean-going vessels of above 1000 dwt; the total for all
the world's fleets was 17,317 ships. In tonnage, the most commonly used
comparative unit among merchant (and naval) fleets, the Soviet Union at
that time ranked 13th in the world. According to Western sources, as of
December 31, 1969, of 19,750 merchantmen in the world's ocean fleets, 1717
were Soviet, aggregating 12,757,000 dwt of the total 297,523,000 dwt. The
Russians then occupied sixth place among merchant fleets. A Soviet source
placed their maritime fleet at "about 1500 transport vessels" with an
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aggregate of "more than 12,000,000 tons" dwt as of February, 1971.
This surge actually began in 1958, as directed by the Seven Year Plan
of economic development adopted by the Soviet Union in that year, and the
greatest portion of it occurred between 1963 and the end of 1965; altogether,
the Soviet merchant tonnage quadrupled between 1958-1968. According to the
Soviet source noted above, "no form of transport in our country has developed
at a more rapid rate than the maritime fleet." Soviet overseas foreign
trade began to grow in the Fifties, at first mainly as a consequence of the
establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. By 1955 commerce with
China accounted for 20 per cent of all Soviet foreign trade. From the Soviet
viewpoint their merchant fleet was inadequate to handle this increased
oceanborne trade: in 1950 half of all Soviet seaborne trade was carried in
Soviet flag ships; by 1955 this figure had declined to less than one-third
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of the trade volume. Writing about this period in later years, the then
Minister of Merchant Marine, Victor E. Bakayev, summed up Soviet unease
about this state of affairs: "Soviet foreign trade became increasingly
dependent upon the world capitalist fleet and the uncertainties of the
CO
capitalist freight market." Russian suspicion of the West and Leninist
assurances of the enmity of all capitalist nations for the Soviet Union
combined to make such a situation intolerable to the Soviets, hence the
forced-draft expansion of the merchant fleet.
The patterns of Soviet foreign policy in the late Fifties and early
Sixties were the prime motivation for the expansion of trade, which in
turn, called for a merchant fleet. The decision to reach out to the un-
committed nations—Khrushchev's "zone of peace"—with economic credits,
developmental aid, and in some cases military equipment, created an in-
crease in the volume of Soviet overseas trade and the demand for Russian
vessels to carry it for reasons of both prestige and secrecy. Overseas
commitments to the "camp of socialism" blossomed as well: even as trade
with China declined as a result of the growing rift between the Soviet
and Chinese leadership, Soviet sailings for Hanoi increased and the
economic dependency of Castro's Cuba remained a constant demand on the
Soviet ability to transport goods by sea.
In the Soviet political system "... all important questions of state
administration in all fields of the economic, political, and cultural life
of the country" are decided by the Council of Ministers, a body which
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corresponds approximately to a Cabinet in Western political terms. The
ministers hold portfolios corresponding to various aspects of the admini-
stration of the Soviet Union, such as Aviation Industry, Foreign Trade, and
Medium Machine Building. Among these is the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet.
In terms of Western corporate organization the Ministry functions as a
central holding company with headquarters in Moscow and subsidiaries in each
of the sea areas in and around the Soviet Union. There are a total of 15
of these subsidiary State Steamship Lines, which control and manage the
assets of the entire maritime establishment within the geographical area
assigned to them. The Soviet fishing fleets fall within the purview of
the Ministry as well as the passenger and cargo carriers.
The state steamship companies are responsible for a much wider range
of activities than are most of their Western counterparts:
In addition to normal carrier functions . . . each of the
Soviet lines has complete area responsibility for all com-
mercial maritime functions such as operation of repair yards,
port facilities . . . salvage operations, maintenance of
intermediate training schools for seagoing and related per-
sonnel, and a varying degree of responsibility for the
housing and social activities of the workers. °0
The Soviets place heavy emphasis on their training program for merchant
fleet personnel. According to the Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine:
Command personnel are trained at four higher and 12
specialized secondary educational establishments
administered by the Ministry of the Merchant Marine.
The rank-and-file personnel are trained at special
AtMerchant Marine schools. OJ-
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In the past five years these schools have trained "close to 20,000
specialists with a higher or specialized secondary education education"
noted the Deputy Minister, and in addition a correspondence school system
of education is very active in the fleet, its students being given up to
forty days leave a year in order to prepare for and pass examinations.
Workers in the Merchant Marine earned the highest average wage in
Soviet industry as of 1965, an amount some 40 per cent higher than the
average monthly money wage for the economy as a whole, and over 24 per





Three additional organizations figure prominently in the operations
of the Soviet merchant fleet: the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Sovfrakht
,
and Sudoimport . The former body controls all the foreign trade of the
Soviet Union, and, to the degree permitted by Soviet trading partners, has
the power to specify the terms of transport of all merchandise involved,
whether imports or exports. Sovfrakht is the government agency which
handles the cargo space arrangements for all Soviet trading agencies, both
booking space and chartering vessels in order to accomplish this.
Sudoimport is the Soviet Union's ship import and export trading
company. According to a Soviet source its sales of Soviet-built ships have
greatly increased in recent years, to the point that it operates in 43
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countries around the world. It reported export sales in recent years of
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26 "large freighters" to nations such as Great Britain, West Germany, and
Sweden, tankers to Algeria and Cuba, floating docks to Bulgaria and Finland,
and tugboats to the United Arab Republic and Tunisia. Hydrofoil craft have
reportedly been sold to the U.S., France, Yugoslavia, Austria, and
Czechoslovakia. "Most of Sudoimport 's purchases have been from the socialist
countries," the source concluded.
In an article published in 1970, the Deputy Minister of Merchant Marine,
V. I. Tikhonov, proudly summarized the scope of operations in 1969. He
reported "about 3200" port calls among the socialist countries, emphasizing
"continuous" sailing to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and "dozens"
of daily sailings to Cuba. He noted the existence of "sea communication
lines" with 70 Asian, African, and Latin American nations, and reported that
in 1969 1,000 port calls were made between four Arab nations, Syria, the
UAR, Libya, and Iraq, an equal number among African states, 342 in India
and "several hundred" among the ports of Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. The specific figures given by Minister Tikhonov
can neither be confirmed nor denied from non-Soviet sources, but the wide
scope of Soviet activity is confirmed in many Western studies.
In commenting on the completion of the annual economic plan for 1970,
the Soviet government noted that foreign trade had increased by 11 per cent
to a total of 22 billion rubles, and that maritime transport had"
stantially" overfulfilled freight volume norms in both coastal and
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overseas shipping. An increase in labor productivity of 7 per cent was
reported, a greater increase than in either rail or river transport. In
spite of the emphasis given to overseas routes by most Soviet commentators,
it appears that, at least as of 1969, a significant portion of the merchant
fleet was involved in Soviet coastal shipping. In this year the fleet
carried 70 million tons of goods along such routes and 82 million tons in
- A 68overseas trade.
A significant portion of the ocean freight market is controlled by
liner conferences , shipping companies which have formed cartels to regulate
the market by means of their aggregate economic power. The Soviets have
shown great interest in joining these archtypically capitalist organiza-
tions, which set freight rates and allocate shares of the market within a
given geographic region among their members. By early 1971 11 Soviet state
lines had become members of such conferences, and all remaining lines were
69
in the process of applying for admission.
It appears that the shipping conferences were in many instances
reluctant to admit the Soviet companies, and the latter engaged in rate
cutting in order to convince the cartels that they would be better served
by allowing the Soviets to join the group, where rates and market shares are
determined by vote of the members, then by competing with them for the
markets. There have been periodic reports of large-scale rate cutting by
the Soviets in the past.
"The Concluding Year of the Five-Year Plan," Pravda, Feburary 4, 1971,
pp. 1-2.
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The Soviet merchant fleet, though of recent construction, has to date
not reflected some of the major changes in marine technology exhibited by
the fleets of other nations. Their ships have tended to be smaller than
average size, and this has been especially true of their tanker fleet, which
averages 9,000 tons dwt against a world average of more than 100,000 tons.
In addition to the lack of large tankers the Soviet fleet does not appear to
make use of the new container ship concept, which other maritime fleets have
enthusiastically embraced. It appears that this will change in the near
future. Minister Tikhonov has stated that the new Five Year Plan calls for
the construction of larger tankers, up to 150,000 tons dwt, and container
72
ships. Another Soviet source reported in 1971 that "special attention
will be paid to the development of seaports . . . there are plans to finish
the first section of a deepwater port in the vicinity of Nakhodka, and to
73begin construction of a new port on the Black Sea . . .
In some areas of merchant fleet design and technology the Soviets
appear to have moved forward rapidly. According to Tikhonov they are
greatly impressed by the potentialities inherent in increased automation.
The introduction of automation is reported to have reduced the crews on
some ships by "nearly a third." They are also attempting to apply computer
technology, both at sea in navigational systems and ashore in coordinating










fleet operations. A recent Soviet newspaper article reported that the
successful use of 48-passenger hovercraft ferries over the past two years
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SEA POWER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Naval forces have historically been used in the following ways as
instruments of foreign policy:
1. As a visible expression of interest in an area or political
situation. Within this context the interest expressed may
be either friendly or coercive in nature, and the employment
of naval forces may be used to express varying degrees of
national commitment to a policy or course of action with
regard to the area or situation.
2. As a means of providing covert or overt surveillance of an
area of the sea or littoral.
3. To link together non-contiguous or distant portions of a
national territory or sphere of influence, both symbolic-
ally and militarily.
4. To serve as a visible manifestation of national wealth,
power, and technical sophistication at times and places
where this would serve the needs of foreign policy.
5. To protect a national merchant fleet or other national
interest in the sea, and to threaten that of other nations.
6. As a defense against the actual or potential threat
manifested by the naval power of another nation or nations.
7. As an instrument of exploration and/or conquest.
From the contemporary era come two additional uses of naval power:
8. As one facet of a multi-force limited war capability.
9. To provide a platform for strategic nuclear forces.
The Navy has been used effectively on several occasions to express
Soviet interest, and on one occasion to express Soviet political commitment
in a crisis situation. Since 1964 the continuous presence of Soviet naval
units in the Mediterranean has served notice of Soviet interest in this
area. The same may be said of Soviet naval activities in the Baltic,
Norwegian, Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, Chuchki, Bering, and
Black Seas, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, Cuban waters, and the
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the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy has been used to express commitment to
the Arab cause and specifically to the {JAR since the Six Day War in 1967.
The expression of this commitment has been visits of Soviet warships to
Egyptian and Syrian ports and by naval manuevers during the 1970 Jordan
crisis. When a large U.S. naval force took station in the waters off the
coast of North Korea following attacks by that country on American naval
and air units in 1968 and 1969, Soviet concern for the security of a
"fraternal socialist government," and to some degree for the security of
its own borders was unmistakably expressed by the actions of Soviet
naval forces.
The Soviet Navy has been used with monotonous regularity to provide
overt surveillance of the naval forces of NATO nations. It must be assumed
that the large Soviet submarine force conducts covert surveillance of
Western oceanic weapon and rocketry test areas, as well as coastal sur-
veillance. Wherever they may be and for whatever purpose, it is certain
that Navy ships serve as valuable sensors to enable the Soviet Union to
remain abreast of developments in the area.
Admiral Gorshkov's forces have made it abundantly clear that the
Black Sea, neutralized by the Lausanne Treaty and the Montreux Convention,
and the Baltic, classified as international under the law of the sea, are
both in fact, Soviet spheres of influence. The same is true of the Sea of
Okhotsk and the north polar seas of the Eastern Hemisphere, though geography
provides indication enough in these cases. In a vast nation where east
and west are still only imperfectly linked the Soviet Navy provides a
valuable military connection between far corners. The same is true with
respect to the Castro regime, which, at least according to communist lore,
owes its continued existence to the Soviet military shield.
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Ships of the Soviet Navy have shown the flag in an arc curling around
Africa from Nigeria on the Atlantic clockwise to Tanzania on the Indian
Ocean, as well along the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula and on the
Indian sub-continent. In general however, the Soviet Navy was not parti-
cularly active in this field until 1968. Among the underdeveloped
nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America the Soviet naval ensign was
seen in the ports of only seven countries from 1960-1967. In 1968 the
total jumped to eleven, all in Africa, the Middle East, or Indian area.
In 1969 the total remained about the same, including repeat visits to Aden,
Yemen, Ethiopia, Ceylon, and Kenya; also in 1969 Soviet fleets units be-
gan to operate openly in the Caribbean, a pattern continued in 1970-71. The
Russians have shown a particular interest in Ethiopia, with at least one
naval visit to Massawa every year since 1965. In 1967 Admiral Gorshkov
paid a visit to Massawa; only India and Algeria have also received such a
manifestation of Soviet naval interest, and that not until 1970.
In the years since World War II the Soviet Union has developed a
great interest in the sea, and a considerable reliance upon it. The catch
of the vast Soviet fishing fleet provides 25 per cent of the protein in
the Soviet diet, an important supplement to an agricultural sector which
is still relatively weak. The trade carried on throughout the world by
the Soviet merchant marine is not only highly desirable in terms of the
Soviet economy, but as well for the support it provides to the foreign
aid program and as an essential instrument of Soviet support of "fraternal
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The Soviet oceano-hydrographic fleet, the largest and most well-equppped
in the world, is exploring the geography and resource content of the world's
oceans.
For all of these reasons the Soviets clearly have the traditional need
for naval power to protect important national interests at sea. The reverse
of this coin is also of great interest to them: NATO powers are heavily
reliant on the use of the sea, and a Soviet capability to threaten this
use weakens the integrity of the alliance and also forces NATO members to
devote resources to preparations to defend vital ocean commerce in wartime,
constituting another drain on their peacetime economies.
Of course the most obvious requirement for Soviet naval power is that
dictated by the force structure of the world's other superpower. The heavy
reliance of the American strategic nuclear forces upon the sea, primarily in
terms of the POLARIS system, but also in reference to the limited war role
of attack carriers, requires a reply in kind and Soviet military literature
clearly indicates that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in wartime is
7Q
the age-old requirement to destroy the striking power of the enemy fleet.
This same conclusion is borne out by the Soviet force structure, which
features the largest force of attack (anti-ship) submarines in the world
and large numbers of surface units armed with anti-ship missies.
Nautical exploration and conquest have vanished from the foreign policy
tool chest, except perhaps in two senses: the discovery and assimilation
of such riches as the ocean and seabed may hold, and the concept of military
intervention. The former activity is conducted largely by Soviet scientific
organizations rather than by the Navy. The Soviet Navy's capability for
military intervention, though small in comparison to that of the U.S. Navy,
78




is certainly sufficient to support such an undertaking under certain con-
ditions. It is subject to severe limitations if opposition by even a small
79
modern military force is postulated, but one must note that in reviewing
the record of interventions undertaken since World War II, there are few
cases of intervening forces being required to fight their way ashore and,
indeed, they have seldom had to engage in combat. In most cases the only
requirement has been to land the troops rapidly and then support them
logistically . The Soviet Navy, with an assist if need be from the merchant
marine, is capable of doing this. With the amphibious lift capacity which
it possessed in 1971 the Soviet Navy could put at least 2,000 troops ashore
simultaneously in a conventional "across the beach" operation. With the
augmentation of ships pressed into service from the Soviet merchant marine
to transport Red Army units to the scene this capability could rapidly be
increased. In addition, the ASW cruisers MOSKVA and LENINGRAD, although
apparently not primarily intended for such use, could serve to land a small
force by means of helicopters. The Soviets frequently conduct amphibious
landing exercises and appear to give considerable attention to their ability
80
to carry out such operations.
The Soviets are using their Navy as an arm of the strategic missile
forces. The appearance in 1969 of the "Y" class balistic missile submarine,
similar to the American POLARIS class, indicates that the Russians share
the view of the NATO powers that many advantages accrue from basing
strategic missile forces at sea.
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The Soviet Navy would be a very effective limited war force under
certain circumstances. It would be able to conduct an effective inter-
diction campaign using the techniques of submarine and mine warfare. In
a situation where air power could be excluded or eliminated, a Soviet force
organized around KYNDA and KRESTA class vessels might well be able to
defeat a NATO surface group of comparable size due to the superior range
of its anti-ship missiles. It must also be borne in mind that the
Soviet Union maintains the largest gun-cruiser force in the world today in
addition to its more modern missile ships. This force of sixteen cruisers,
all but three of them of postwar construction, are capable of speeds in
excess of 30 knots and mount guns which outrange those found on any
ship currently on active service with the U.S. Navy.
Maritime nations support merchant fleets for essentially three reasons:
1. To add to the total of their GNP by reducing or eliminating
the outflow of exchange to procure foreign shipping services,
and by increasing the inflow of foreign currency, gold, or
credits as a consequence of providing shipping services to
other nations.
2. To serve as an arm of the national defense by making avail-
able a pool of shipping to be used in time of war and to
reduce or eliminate dependence on other nations to carry
goods in peacetime the non-availability of which would place
the nation at a serious disadvantage (e.g. , so-called
"strategic goods")
.
3. To add to their international prestige and influence by pro-
jecting an image of national vitality and modernity to other
nations, and indicating an interest in the course of events
along the trade routes.
All of these considerations are factors in Soviet merchant policy.
The following statement of the objectives of Soviet maritime policy,
made by the Minister of Merchant Marine in 1965, clearly illustrates his
nation's conception of its merchant fleet as an instrument of foreign policy;
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1. The active utilization of the merchant fleet in the economic
competition between the socialist and the capitalist systems.
2. The satisfaction in full of the requirements of the economy
and the foreign commerce of the country for domestic and
imported cargos
.
3. The achievement of an increase in the share of the Soviet
mechant fleet in international shipping.
4. The extension of concrete assistance to the developing countries
in setting up their independent national economies and foreign
trade.
5. The containment of the expansion of the aggressive imperialist
states in the sphere of international navigation.
This statement requires additional interpretation in the light of the
unique nature of Soviet semantics. The term "economic competition" carries
a wider meaning in the Soviet lexicon than the Western, including as it does
all methods of advancing national influence short of open warfare. The
Soviet concept of independence is also sui generis and lends a deeper mean-
ing to the objective voiced in paragraph four. In Soviet terms an "inde-
pendent national economy" is one in which the West plays no role, and the
Soviet Union, as the only developed nation which offers trade and assistance
completely without political or economic condition, plays a dominant role.
Although concern has been expressed in Western shipping circles that
that the Soviets intend to use their interlocking foreign trade and merchant
shipping organizations in conjunction with the economic
resources of the Soviet government to drive other merchant fleets out of
business, it appears unlikely that this is an operative Soviet goal at the
present time. The Soviet goal at the present time. The Soviet decision
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to join shipping conferences is indicative not of an intent to drive the
Western companies out of business but to share in the benefits of the cartel
system. The relative size and relative growth rate of the Soviet merchant
fleet in comparison to those of other maritime nations also militates
against such a grand design. The Soviet fleet has made a spectacular surge
in comparison to its pre-1958 size, but in terms of total capacity it is
simply not large enough to dominate ocean trade, nor will it be in 1980 with
on
a projected tonnage of 27 million dwt.
It can, however, dominate the ocean carriage trade with certain areas,
and this is very definitely a Soviet goal. Building on their carefully con-
structed anti-colonial image, the Russians seek to dominate the trade of the
developing nations as a major part of their campaign to demonstrate the
ubiquity of Soviet power. When these nations become disenchanted with the
economics of c.i.f. imports and f.o.b. exports the Soviets, by virtue of the
"special relationship" previously developed, hope to supply the ships, train
the sailors, and develop the port facilities for Third World flag merchant
fleets.
The Soviets also clearly intend to carry as much of their total sea-
borne trade as possible in their own ships, to avoid the loss of foreign
exchange through payment of freight charges to foreign shipping companies.
When their trade partner has a large flag fleet of its own it is unlikely
that they will succeed in carrying more than about half the trade in Soviet
ships, as the pattern of recent Anglo-Soviet trade indicates, but they seek
o o
to reduce the foreign share to the absolute minimum. In 1965 Soviet
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sources reported that 70 per cent of total seaborne Soviet trade was
carried in Soviet ships.
According to a Soviet source ships of their merchant marine called over
1,000 times at ports in 23 African nations during 1969. New maritime trade
routes were established calling at Dakar, Takoradi, Bathhurst, Accra,
oc
Conakry, Dar-es-Salasm, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Berbera, and Mogadishu. In
addition to the boost to Soviet prestige provided by the high visibility of
this modern, well-kept fleet of cargo and passenger vessels, the extension
of regular Soviet service to these ports brings with it Soviet trade dele-
gations, shipping company offices, and consulates, further increasing the
Russian presence.
The Soviets have been active in assisting African and Arab nations in
developing port facilities capable of handling modern, deep-draft vessels,
which not only offers them increased opportunities to gain influence in
these nations, but allows the Russians to avail themselves of the efficiencies
of larger tankers, bulk cargo carriers and containerships without losing
access to trade routes because port facilities are not sufficiently modern
to discharge such ships. After developing the Yemeni port of Hodeida the
Soviets installed their own personnel "... to help their Yemeni col-
86
leauges operate the port." Aden, in the People's Republic of Yemen,
operates undera Russian harbormaster. ' The deepwater port of Berbera,
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Somalia, was built with Soviet economic credits, and on the west coast of
Africa the Russians assisted with the improvement of the ports of Conakry
and Benty in the Republic of Guinea. They have been active in port develop-
ment in India as well, whose Navy, with many Soviet-built warships, is
dependent to a considerable degree upon Soviet material support. The Soviet
Union has constructed facilities for the Indian Navy at Vishakhapatnam on
the east coast and assisting with development of a naval base at Vizag, in
oo
the Andaman Islands. In addition the government of Bengla Desh has
announced that war damage at the port of Chittagong will be repaired by the
Russians.
The Soviet fishing fleet, largest in the world, has been active in the
Indian Ocean, and fisheries agreements have been completed between the
Soviet Union and several nations around the littoral. These agreements,
such as that noted previously with Mauritius, provide the Soviets with an-
other vehicle for establishing a precedent of Soviet presence and involve-
ment in the area. Once the passage of time has made this presence un-
remarkable attempts will be made to transform such agreements into arrange-
ments for naval vessels. Such agreements have already led to the establish-
89
ment of a network of offshore mooring buoys for submarine support.
Soviet sea power should be viewed not only within the historical con-
text of the phenomenon itself, but within the context of Soviet foreign
policy methods and objectives as well. It is not within the scope of this
study to trace the history of Soviet foreign policy, but its general
features since 1945 must be noted to provide a perspective within which to
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to view the growth of Soviet sea power.
It should be noted that the present era of "peaceful co-existence" is
neither unique nor necessarily a lasting feature of Soviet foreign policy.
Historically, Soviet foreign policy has alternated between periods of
militant confrontation with capitalism, emphasizing revolutionary violence
and eschewing political coalition with non- communist groups, and periods of
less violent tactics, making use of "contradictions" between capitalist
nations and collaboration with political forces which are not communist but
seek change which the Soviets view as potentially advantageous to themselves.
The basis for the Soviet choice of tactics has been their calculation
of "relation of forces" between capitalism and communism. In the Marxist-
Leninist view of historical development the tide of communism's advance to-
ward ultimate victory ebbs and flows, and foreign policy tactics have been
adjusted in order to wring maximum advance of the cause from favorable
circumstances, and to obtain a "breathing spell," in which to build strength
and await the next incoming tide, when circumstances appear unfavorable.
Since the end of World War II the top Soviet leadership had changed
twice, excluding Malenkov's brief period of at least titular ascendancy. As
they do in other nations , these changes in leadership have brought changes in
the style and emphasis of Soviet foreign policy in each case. There has
been in addition one major tactical shift, from a period of Cold War mili-
tance to one of "peaceful co-existence."
Soviet foreign policy in the first five years following the war sought
to make use of the disruption of the European political and economic system
to extend Soviet influence as far to the west as possible; to "sovietize"
the political and economic systems of those nations occupied by the Red Army
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and to probe troubled areas elsewhere for possible gains. The Soviets
expected the U.S. to withdraw its troops from Europe soon after the war, as
Roosevelt had indicated at Yalta. When this did not occur, the weakening
of U.S. power and influence in Europe became a major object of Soviet
foreign policy. Functioning as the right hand to conventional Soviet
diplomacy, is 1947 communist movements throughout the world terminated
their wartime policy of united front against fascism and began a program of
disruption, subversion, and revolution. In Korea, an area which probably
appeared to the Soviets to be outside the area of vital American concern in
Asia, an attempt was made to enlarge the communist sphere by limited war,
waged through North Korean and later Chinese Communist forces.
In assessing the results of these tactics in 1951, prior to the Nine-
teenth Party Congress, Stalin and the Politburo probably felt that on the
balance some modifications were in order. Achievements in the past five
years included the successful consolidation of Soviet poller in Eastern
Europe, the addition of the world's most populous nation to the "camp of
socialism," and the triumph of Soviet science in ending the American
atomic monopoly. Against these solid successes, however, were arrayed some
seriously unfavorable developments: the crystalization of American resolve
to resist Soviet expansion, as evidenced by the Truman Doctrine, the forma-
tion of NATO, the Marshall Plan, and rearmament; the formation of the
Federal Republic of Germany and growing evidence that at least the United
States was looking to German re-armament; the hardening of Western resolve
to remain in Berlin; the political isolation of the world communist movement
as a result of its opposition to bourgeois political movements at a time when
nationalism was becoming the major force in the colonial and former colonial
areas; and the beginnings of economic recovery in Western Europe.
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The first signs of the shift to the tactic of "peaceful coexistence"
are discernable in the policies of the last two years of Stalin's life; a
growing Soviet feeling that the immediate postwar opportunities for revo-
lutionary progress had passed, and a defensive strategic outlook tempered
with optimism that the growing strength of the Soviet economy and the pro-
gress of Soviet science would soon bring about a more favorable relation
of forces.
The Soviet view of the United Nations was initially that it would be
the vehicle by which the Great Powers would run the postwar world. The
Security Council and General Assembly would merely ratify the decisions
arrived at by the Big Four Council of Foreign ministers. When this did not
turn out to be the case, the United Nations was declared to be another anti-
Soviet coalition. The Soviet Union regarded the UN specialized agencies
with suspicion and distrust and boycotted them almost entirely. Far from
regarding the UN as a useful forum for spreading Soviet influence, the
Soviets did their best to keep issues in which they had an interest out of
the General Assembly, and in fact tried to limit United Nations membership
to those nations which had actively participated in World War II against
the Axis powers.
Although there were some changes in tone during Malenkov's not quite
two years as head of government, notably the decision to cease obstructing
a negotiated Korean settlement, diplomatic efforts in support of a negoti-
ated settlement in Indochina and the beginnings of foreign aid to non-
communist nations, the new emphasis in Soviet foreign policy did not gather
force until 1955. In that year Nikita Khrushchev and the policy which he
was to symbolize burst fully upon the world. In a flurry of East-West
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dialogue the Austrian State Treaty was at last signed, marking the first
withdrawal of the Red Army from its wartime high tide mark; the first
East-West summit meeting since the onset of the Cold War took place
pleasantly but inconsequentially at Geneva, and the Soviet Union formally
(but ficticiously) recognized the sovereignty of East Germany and
established diplomatic relations with the Bonn government, thereby hinting
strongly at acceptance of the division of Germany as a more or less per-
manent feature. These relatively conciliatory moves were balanced by the
formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Eastern Europe, and in the
developing nations, the first agreement to supply arms from the "camp of
socialism" and a triumphal State tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan
featuring the vilification of "western imperialism" and a cast of
thousands.
This first year of the Khrushchev era thus displayed many of the
major themes of the period: a style of diplomacy which was more genial
and personal than that which had preceded it, yet somehow never quite
delivered the substance of the accommodations that it seemed to promise;
the acceptance of a relatively stable East-West division of Europe; and
vigorous efforts to replace Western influence with Soviet influence in the
developing nations.
The revamping of the practices of Soviet foreign policy was soon
followed by suitable adjustments in its theory. Although over-shadowed
at the time by the drama of Stalin's denunciation, a new Soviet view of
"peaceful coexistence"—not as a temporary expedient for defensive
purposes but as an offensive tactic of indefinite duration—emerged from
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Stripped of Marxist-Leninist
rhetoric the substance of the new "peaceful coexistence" and its role in
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Soviet foreign policy has been admirably summarized by Marshall Shulman:
. . . the mode by which peaceful coexistence is intended
to achieve the ultimate purposes of the Revolution is
through the conjuncture of a number of factors: An ac-
ceptance of Soviet military ascendancy, a demonstrated
superiority of the. Soviet economic system as a mode of
organizing human resources , the detachment of the under-
developed nations from the Western bloc, the inadequacies
of the capitalist economic and social systems. The end
result would be the voluntary peaceable acceptance of a __
new political unity in the world under Soviet leadership.
The official attitude toward war and its role in the triumph of
socialism also underwent major surgery. In recognition of a destructive
power unforeseen by Lenin, Khrushchev revised the latter' s theses to
postulate that war with the capitalist powers was no longer fatalistically
inevitable, and that, indeed, all-out war must be avoided at practically
all cost. In a further modification it was revealed that the transition
from capitalism to. socialism might take place without violent revolution
under some circumstances. In later years, in the face of Chinese attacks
on Soviet revolutionary spirit, the Soviets were forced to find an
ideological formula which would allow them to avoid the danger of nuclear
war, yet allow them to match Chinese rhetorical militance with regard to
support for revolutions. The result was the emergence in 1961 of the
classification of wars into three groups: world wars, local wars, and
national liberation wars. The latter, waged by exploited peoples
against the exploiting capitalist nations were "just wars," and as such
were to be given "all-round support "by the Soviet Union. The exact sub-
stance of "all-round support" was left purposely vague, but in practice
it stopped short of direct military action by the Soviet Union.
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Finding the Arabs quite willing to ignore the fact that the Soviet
Union had been one of the original champions of Israel's existence, the
Russians made use of anti-colonial and anti-semitic sentiment to insinuate
themselves into Middle Eastern politics. Having firmly established their
position as patrons of Arab nationalism in the aftermath of the Anglo-
French-Israeli invasion of 1956, the Soviets began to invest heavily in
economic and military aid to the Arab states, primarily Egypt.
The "new look" in Soviet foreign policy which featured the retrieval
of non-alignment from its Stalinist obloquy and the idealogical rehabilita-
tion of nationalist leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru, found a warm welcome
in India, which along with Egypt received the majority of Soviet economic
and military aid, and at least initially in sub-Saharan Africa, although
by the end of 1961 the intricacies of African politics and the heavy-
handedness of some Soviet diplomats had dealt a considerable setback to
the Soviet program.
The introduction of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba in 1962 brought
the world as close as it has ever come to nuclear war. Soviet motivation
and the degree to which the present leadership was in agreement with
Khrushchev's decision remains conjectural, but the crisis should be long
remembered as evidence that Soviet foreign policy cannot safely be cast
into a comfortable mold based upon an assessment of Leninism as disinclined
to great risks and the domination of Eastern Europe as a defensive measure.
Both the nature of its government and the dialectical tradition of com-




The growth of the Soviet-Arab and Soviet-Cuban relationships during
the Khrushchev years was an extremely significant event in the history of
Soviet foreign policy, harking back to the days when the Russian Empire
pursued interests in the Western Hemisphere, Mediterranean and Indian sub-
continent. This was a milestone in the reemergence of Russia as a x^orld
power and created requirements for the resources of sea power to support
foreign policy which has not existed in Russia since the founding of the
Soviet Union.
During Khrushchev's stewardship the Soviet attitude toward the United
Nations underwent a great change. The Soviet Union came to realize that
even if it could not control UN activities as well as it would like to, it
could, by participating in the broad range of UN affairs, block or at
least lessen the effect of programs that it viewed as anti-Soviet, make
valuable contacts with nations of the Third World, avail itself of numerous
opportunities to press the Soviet viewpoint on a broad spectrum of issues.
Realizing that the new nations were much more likely to be anti-Western or
neutral than anti-Soviet, the Soviet Union became more willing to see UN
membership grow, and as a consequence began to devote more attention to
cultivating votes in the General Assembly.
Khrushchev's policies toward Western Europe seem with one exception
to have been aimed at formalizing the status quo which emerged there during
the decade after Germany's surrender. He sought a German peace treaty
which would formalize acceptance of Europe's postwar boundaries and Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. He also sought an international agreement
which would bar West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. Attempts from
1958-1961 to use access to Berlin as a lever to bring about treaty
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negotiations on Soviet terms did not bear fruit; neither did the 1958
Rapacki Plan proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The
exception to this^ policy of stabilization was American involvement in
European affairs, which Khrushchev, as did Stalin before him, sought to
reduce.
If Soviet leaders thought that the greatest obstacle to their control
of Eastern Europe would come from the West they were mistaken. The East
Berlin riots of 1953, the Poznan riots of 1956 and the Hungarian Revolution
of that same year made it clear that disaffection with the camp of
socialism was not an isolated phenomenon caused by the intransigence of
Tito. It became apparent during Khrushchev's time if not before then
that the maintenance of the desired political atmosphere in Eastern Europe
was going to require continuing investments of both the attention of Soviet
policymakers and the resources of the Red Army.
Although it did not seem so to western observers at the time it appears
that Sino-Soviet relations got steadily worse after Stalin's death. One of
the first signs that the Chinese intended to discard the role of grateful
Soviet pupil came in 1954 when Mao Tse-tung declined to allow the Russians
to maintain their base at Dairen. Although the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) went along with the new line on Stalin in 1956 they let the Russians
know that such decisions affecting the world movement should not be taken
without prior consultation. In 1958, Peking succeeded in manuevering Moscow
into a public pledge that any attack upon the Chinese People's Republic
would be considered as attack upon the Soviet Union, and this on behalf
of an issue of little importance to Russia, possession of the islands of
Quemoy and Matsu. By 1959 the Russians were sufficiently displeased with

59
their Chinese neighbors to withdraw their technical assistance from the
nuclear development program and renege on a pledge to provide a "sample"
atomic weapon for study.
By the end of 1960 Chinese intent to challenge the Soviet Union for
leadership of the world communist movement was unmistakable to Moscow, and
the Russians retaliated by ending their program of technical assistance in
Chinese industrial development and seeking to isolate the CCP within the
international movement. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated rapidly and
publicly after this as Peking attacked the "peaceful coexistence" line
and the Nuclear Test Ban treaty as sellouts, tried to exclude the
Russians from attendance at a planned "Second Bandung" set for 1965 on the
ground that the USSR was not an Asian power, and competed vigorously with
the Soviet trade and aid program in a dozen Third World nations. Just two
months before the Central Committee of the CPSU removed Khrushchev from
office the Chinese took not only a more insulting but a more threatening
tack: Mao publicly accused the Russians of "social imperialism" in Eastern
Europe and then restated the Chinese claim to sovietized Outer Mongolia
and indicated that Chinese territorial losses to Imperial Russia were not
considered to be final.
In October, 1964, Khrushchev was forced from power by a coalition of
his erstwhile lieutenants, led by Aleksi Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev,
ushering in the present phase of Soviet foreign policy. His successors,
while not as flamboyant, have been more successful than Khrushchev in most
areas of Soviet foreign policy, the notable exception being the dispute with
China. Sino-Soviet relations have gotten steadily worse, compounded of a
blend of ideological differences and the clash of two formidable national-
isms. Troubled by the continued stirrings of ideas of individual
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freedoms and popularly responsive government which had followed in the wake
of the Secret Speech, the new regime, after a period of hesitation, moved
both within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to bring the deviants to
heel. Their policies evoked echoes of an earlier era, leading on observer
91
to characterize them as "the return of Stalin's ghost."
The primary activity of Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev's suc-
cessors has been the expansion of Soviet influence in the world, lured by
the scent of withdrawal by the North Atlantic powers and driven by fear of
their former protege, the Peoples Republic of China. Having failed to pre-
vent Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons the present Russian leadership
has greatly increased its own nuclear arsenal and at the end of 1971 was in
a position to either seek to stabilize the strategic nuclear balance on a
basis of rough parity with the United States, or attempt to achieve a
politically effective degree of nuclear superiority. A basic reversal of
postwar Soviet policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany has taken
place, as the Russians have largely ceased their efforts to isolate Bonn
and seek instead a negotiated acceptance of postwar borders and Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. The matter of German nuclear armament remains
open but the Russians seem to have effectively removed it from considera-
tion at the moment by allowing German Ostpolitik to progress, keeping alive
German hopes for eventual negotiated reunification as long as they don't
do anything threatening. With regard to China the Soviets have clearly
given up any hope of a reconciliation as long as Mao retains major influ-
ence, and have, while awaiting internal developments in China, attempted
to attain a favorable international position with detente in Europe and
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the construction of ententes if not actual alliances in the Mideast, Indian
Ocean basin and perhaps Japan. As a necessary condition of the expansion
of Soviet influence the Russian leaders have greatly enhanced the reach of
conventional Soviet military power.
Through Khrushchev led the Soviet Union to the realization of global
opportunities and commitments he did not strengthen the Soviet Union's
military power correspondingly. This has been a major task of the Brezhnev-
Kosygin leadership. They have sought to strengthen the Soviet position
viv-a-vis the United States on all levels of warfare. Between 1965 and
1969 Soviet land-based ICBM forces increased five-fold while sea-based
92
missiles more than doubled. The growth of naval forces and marines, as
well as large transport aircraft such as the AN-22 increased Soviet reach
on the conventional warfare level.
The need for enemies against which to rally both the world movement
and the Russian people themselves has grown steadily since the new leaders
assumed power in Russia. It is likely that this is more than merely a
cynical tactic, but as well a manifestation of a genuine fear on the part
of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) that extensive contact with the West
and a relaxation of the struggle against capitalism will inevitably erode
Party control of their own country and Eastern Europe. The discovery of
the activities of Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy of the KGB and his subsequent
trial and execution in 1965 was a tremendous shock to the Russians, for
here was a traitor who had actually done what he was accused of doing, not
a political rival being eliminated on trumped-up charges • It set off a
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witch hunt both in Russia and in Eastern Europe and provided tremendous
93
reinforcement to CPSU paranoia. During the same period a small but
stubborn "democratic movement" developed among Russian scientists, writers,
and even some in the military, which advocated the actual practice of
94
civil liberties and rule of law as specified in the Soviet constitution.
The "Prague Spring" of 1968 was surely seen by the Russians as another
warning what contact with the West and too great an atmosphere of detente
in Europe might do to their position in that part of the continent if Soviet
troops were not present to support "the progressive forces" and fend off
subversion and "German revanchism."
While Khrushchev often sought to obtain dramatic foreign policy gains
through the application of sudden initiative—in Berlin, in the United
Nations, in Cuba—the style of Soviet foreign policy since he was turned
out of office has been that of a powerful but conservative business cor-
poration, seeking to build a solid foundation as the basis for advance.
Sea power has very much played a role in this modus operandi . Instead of
seeking a permanent nuclear missile presence in the Western Hemisphere by
emplacing weapons in Cuba, the present leadership has obtained the same
93
Penkovskiy ,with impeccable Party credentials and a brilliant career
behind him, became an agent for Western intelligence and appears to have
furnished extremely damaging information about the Soviet missile program,
information which enabled President Kennedy to know that American ICBM
strength was in fact far superior to Russia's at the time of the Cuban
missile crisis. For an analysis of Penkovskiy 's effect upon the Soviets,
see anatole Shub , op. cit
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, Chapter Eight. See also Oleg Penkovskiy, The
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1970) provides a contemporary Russian view.
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result with less risk throtigh the use of sea-based missiles, while at the
same time expanding Soviet use of Cuba as a military base through in-
creased deployment of other naval forces as well. Rather than a colorful
personal tour of the Indian Ocean area the less dramatic but more influen-
tial incursion of naval vessels and fishing trawlers has occurred. In the
Mediterranean Soviet influence flows through a conduit of merchantmen
from Odessa, Sevastopol, and Rostov to Alexandria, Latakia, and Algiers,
while the Navy's permanent presence demonstrates that the U.S. is not the
only nation with the means to support its friends and chastise its foes in
this most ancient arena of sea power.
The ultimate goal of Soviet foreign policy has been, and remains, the
global ascendancy of Marxism-Leninism as a political philosophy. In the
Soviet view this equates to the global ascendancy of the Soviet Union, at
least until the "withering away" of all states occurs after mankind reaches
its highest historical stage, communism. Since it is the worker's father-
land, the interests of all true proletarians must be identical with Soviet
interests. Professed communist states like China who differ with the Soviet
Union are thus by definition heretics. As Marxist-Leninists, the Soviets
believe that they will be bitterly opposed in the pursuit of this goal by
those nations where the capitalist class and its political philosophy are
dominant. Although it accepts the reality of a world system made up of
states, and deals with them individually and collectively in the short run
as allies, as neutrals, or as enemies just as other states do, for the
Soviet Union the long-term frame of reference remains the class struggle,
the conflict between socialism and capitalism. The effect of this is a '
world view in which all capitalist states are regarded as fundamentally
hostile, regardless of the political alignment of the moment. There is
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literally nothing, other than embracing Soviet-style socialism as a poli-
tical philosophy, which the latter can do to cleanse themselves of this
hostility in Soviet eyes.
These fundamental aspects of the Marxist-Leninist outlook have their
parallels in the pre-communist Russian national ethic, in which may be seen
both a sense of mission and a perception of the world beyond as hostile.
Russian messianism was apparent in the views of 16th century religious
leaders who propounded the doctrine of Muscovy as "the Third Rome." As
the only remaining independent Orthodox Christian state (the others having
come under the rule of the Ottoman Empire) Muscovy was, in their view,
destined to be the successor to Byzantium and become the seat of a third
Empire. This sense of messianism and of Russians as a chosen people con-
tinued into the 19th century, where it x^as expressed in several forms:
The doctrine of Pan-Slavism, in which view it was the Russian destiny to
unite and rule all the Slavic peoples; Russian intervention in European
politics as the protector of royal legitimacy; and in Russian literature,
most notably in the works of Dostoevski and Pushkin. The Tsars anticipated
their Soviet successors in a suspicion of the world beyond their frontiers
and the desire to insulate their people against its political ideas
—
Russian soldiers returning home from France in 1815 were segregated from
the general population in the fear that they had absorbed dangerous poli-
95
tical ideas in the course of their sojourn.
The blend of Marxist-Leninist proletarian internationalism and Russian
messianism has produced a Soviet "arrogance of power" which far surpasses
95
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that conceived by the originator of the phrase. It is a sense of cosmic
righteousness which once moved the Soviet foreign minister to say with
regard to his country's desire that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and
other territory:
. .
. we cannot allow the solution of this vital and urgent
problem to depend on the ill-will of the present rulers of
Finland. This problem will have to be solved by the efforts
of the USSR itself in friendly collaboration with the Finnish
people. 96
The "friendly collaboration" ultimately resulted in over 260,000 casualties.
This attitude persists in the present, where it is displayed with
striking clarity in the Brezhnev Doctrine. Advanced as an answer to for-
eign Communist critics of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it
asserts that the Soviet Union, in the name of the class struggle and pro-
letarian internationalism, has both the right and duty to intervene forcibly
in the affairs of any member of the "socialist commonwealth" despite such
"abstract notions" as national sovereignty and self-determination. The
limits of the "socialist commonwealth" have never been defined. Seeking
to lay to rest any false impressions which the sudden appearance in
Czechoslovakia of more than a quarter million WTO troops may have given to
the uninitiated, Pravda, said:
. . . socialist armies can have no other task than the
defense and strengthening of socialism .... The Soviet
Army cannot be used for seizing territory, acquiring
colonies, nor for aggression against peoples. The Soviet
Army is only a liberating Army."'
Though the present Soviet leaders continue to view the world through
the lens of Marxism-Leninsim and to clothe their statements in the jargon
of proletarian internationalism they are in fact not internationalists of
any stripe but Russian nationalists, less the intellectual heirs of Lenin
96
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than of Peter the Great, Catherine, and Stalin. Stalin's program of "build-
ing socialism in one country" was a drive to give Soviet Russia the economic
and military sinews of world power as rapidly as possible. It was inter-
rupted by the devastation of World War II and the position of unprecedented
power and influence which devolved upon the United States as a result. It
has been carried to fruition by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership.
Fueled by a tradition of more than five centuries of territorial ex-
pansion, rationalized by a once religious but now secular creed which por-
trays it as the chosen instrument of mankind's higher destiny, and but-
tressed by a doctrine of historical inevitability, Russia stands on the
brink of the final quarter of the 20th century in the most powerful posi-
tion it has ever known. Russian history and recent trends alike suggest
that outward pressure by the Soviet Union in an attempt to extend Russian
hegemony unless blocked by a stronger Power will be a feature of world
politics in the 1970s.

CHAPTER IV
COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. NAVAL FORCES
One aspect of the consideration of the impact of the growth of Soviet
sea power upon U.S. foreign policy must necessarily be the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the two navies. Table I and Figures 1 and 2
present some key features of each Navy.
Several aspects of the quantitative comparison displayed in Table I
deserve further mention. It should be noted that the preponderance of the
Soviet submarine force is not in ballistic missile submarines, designed to
deliver strategic nuclear weapons against land-based targets, but in sub-
marines armed with torpedoes and anti-ship missies. The Soviets have
clearly tailored their submarine force for the interdiction of sea lines
of communication.
The Soviet Navy has about a three-to-one advantage in cruiser strength,
especially in cruisers armed with naval guns. The U.S. Navy has no "gun
cruisers" currently in active service; the Soviets are believed to have
sixteen. This provides the Soviet Navy with a better capability to provide
naval bombardment of targets ashore, a necessity for conducting amphibious
landings against defended coasts.
Large amphibious ships, of the type required to transport troops over
long distances and supply them with food and equipment, are conspicuous by
their absence in the Soviet Navy. The Soviet merchant fleet, centrally
controlled and wholly manned by Soviet or East European nationals, is
capable of making up for much of this disparity on short notice.
Soviet naval forces do not include ship-based fixed-wing aircraft,
which can provide reconnaissance and air defense for surface ships, and
provide the means to project naval power inland in support of ground forces.
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This, combined with the fact that the presently known anti-aircraft
missiles on Soviet ships are for the most part short range (9-12 nautical
98
miles) means that Soviet surface forces are relatively vulnerable to air
attack. The shore-based aircraft of the Soviet Naval Air Force are not
designed for defense of Soviet ships against air attack, and have neither
the performance characteristics nor the types of weapons required for air-
to-air combat.
A more graphic representation of the combat potential inherent in the
two navies is given by Figures 1 and 2. In naval warfare, as in boxing,
the contestant with the greater reach has the advantage. This is of course
even more true in modern naval engagements, where one "punch"—if it con-
tains a nuclear war-head—may be decisive.
Figure 1, which depicts the reach of representative Soviet and U.S.
Naval forces in a situation in which the American group included an attack
aircraft carrier, indicates the potentially decisive advantage which the
U.S. Navy force would enjoy. If detected, either of the Soviet forces
represented in this case could be destroyed by carrier aircraft before it
approached the American force to a range within the reach of its missiles.
This is not to imply that such an outcome is assured—Soviet surface ships,
aircraft, or, especially submarines, might be able to escaDe detection and
approach within striking range—but subject to the uncertainties inherent
in naval warfare the U.S. force would be in a very favorable position. It
must further be noted that the circumstances depicted above assumes that
a state of hostilities exists prior to the encounter of the forces, and
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indicate a total of 270 conventional (diesel-electric powered) and 78
nuclear powered submarines in the Soviet Navy. Secretary of Defense
Laird's testimony before Congress concerning the FY 1972 Defense Budget
indicated that the Soviets had 264 conventional and 87 nuclear powered
submarines. Other than noting that 17 of the nuclear powered submarines
were of the "Y" class, similar to the US POLARIS submarines, Secretary
Laird provided no breakdown of the Soviet submarine force by types of
submarine.
Laird, op_. cit . , listed 215 '-'major surface combatants."






















All of these vessels are used to transport troops, equipment and
supplies to the area of an amphibious landing and then put them ashore
using helicopters, small boats, amphibious tanks and personnel carriers,
or, in the case of the Tank Landing Ship, by driving the vessel's bow up
onto the beach to allow direct access to the shore.
p
Such an Air Wing can operate from any one of the 13 Attack Carriers
,
and consists of 24 fighters for protection of the carrier force and escort
of attack and reconnaissance aircraft. 36-48 attack aircraft to strike at
seaborne of land-based enemy forces, 3-6 reconnaissance aircraft, 2-4
aerial tankers for midair refueling, and 4 early warning radar picket air-
craft.
One ASW Air Group operates from each of the three ASW Carriers, and
consists of 21 fixed-wing, piston-engine ASW aircraft, 16 ASW helicopters,
and 3 radar picket aircraft.
g
U.S. aircraft are intended primarily for ASW and all carry special
submarine detection equipment for this purpose. They may be armed with
torpedoes, rockets, or bombs. Soviet aircraft are largely intended for
locating and destroying enemy surface ships, although some are equipped
with submarine detection equipment. In addition to bombs, rockets, or
torpedoes, the majority of these aircraft may be armed with anti-ship mis-
siles which may be launched 90 miles or more from the target.
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was detected and within range of its weapons. If Soviet forces were al-
ready within missile range of the American carrier at the outbreak of the
conflict the American advantage in reach might be negated.
Figure 2 displays a similar situation, but without the American
carrier. Here it will be noted that the reach advantage clearly lies
with the Soviets. In this case the American force may be able to defend
itself against Soviet anti-ship missiles using either gunfire or anti-
aircraft missiles of its own, but it has no way to strike at the source of
the Soviet missiles—the ship, submarine, or aircraft which launches them—
until the latter is within the much shorter range of U.S. naval weapons.
This scenario is, of course, subject to the same element of uncertainty as
that of Figure 1, but even granting this the advantage would rest with the
Soviets
.
On March 11, 1971, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the
Fiscal Year 1972 military posture and budget of the U.S. Navy. During the
course of this testimony he assessed the relative positions of the two
navies. He noted that while the ships and weapons of the U.S. Navy (with
the exception of the POLARIS submarine force) were designed to enable the
U.S. to control sea lines of communication and project American power in
defense of vital overseas interests, those of the Soviet Navy were
designed to counter American naval forces and deny the U.S. the use of the
seas in support of allies and overseas forces.
The Admiral was particularly concerned with the threat posed by the
heavy Soviet investment in long-range anti-ship missile systems, noting
that these systems have been "incorporated in 20 major surface combatants,
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65 submarines, and 160 patrol craft," as well as in "over 200" long range
bombers of the Soviet Naval Air Force and the Long Range Air Force (a group
similar in function to the U.S. Strategic Air Command). He evaluated the
long range bomber threat to U.S. and allied forces as "significant" through-
out much of the North Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean, and went on to
state that "In the Norwegian, North, Baltic and Eastern Mediterranean Seas,
this threat becomes acute."
Since it must be assumed that the U.S. would not strike at the Soviet
Union unless attacked, the combat potential of American forces after a
Soviet attack had been launched would be crucial in any conflict between
the two nations. In the Mediterranean and elswhere Soviet vessels armed
with anti-ship missiles, exercising their right under international law to
free passage on the high seas, are often within striking range of American
carriers and other forces. Commenting on present U.S. vulnerability to
such missiles Admiral Zumwalt said:
This vulnerability of our surface ships could be reduced in
presence of attack carriers by virtue of the fact that the
enemy surface-to-surface missile firing ships would not be
permitted to survive in strike range of the carrier. But
the advantage is currently negated by the offensive strike
capability of the Soviet ships trailing ours. In the
absence of sea-based air; and even in the presence of sea-
based air, if the Soviets should strike first, surface sea
control forces and sealift forces are open to attack from
three media.
After implying that present defenses against such missiles were not ade-
uate, he went on to say, "In the absence of our attack carriers, our
remaining sea control forces are out-gunned in the face of a Soviet surface
action force."
It appears that an effective U.S. naval strategy in the face of the
threat represented by the Soviet Navy is to be able to prevent, at all
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costs, the destruction of the vital attack carrier force by a Soviet sur-
prise attack with surface missile ships and submarines and then to wage
effective antisubmarine warfare in the vicinity of the carriers while they
destroy Soviet surface forces with air strikes. Although the vulnerability
of the modern attack carrier to anti-ship missiles with conventional war-
99
heads may well not be so great as many think, the concern voiced by
Admiral Zumwalt indicates that the most prudent tactic would be to with-
hold the attack carriers from the confrontation area, out of the range of
missiles from the Soviet force, until after the commencement of hostilities,
Such an action would, however, leave any U.S. "presence force" in the area
of contention at a grave disadvantage, thereby reducing its ability to act
as a stabilizing influence or a deterrent to Soviet military action. What
is needed is a way to maintain a credible presence in a trouble zone and
probe Soviet intentions without risking the attack carriers. A similar
need arises when the opponent is not the Soviet Union itself but a state
armed with Soviet missile boats, like Egypt. A second requirement is for
numerous and highly effective ASW forces.
Plans which have been announced for the replacement of the many
obsolescent ships still in use by the American Navy include the types of
weapon systems which could be used to implement such a strategy. One such
system is the proposed sea control ship (SCS) , which would be similar in
size to a light cruiser but very austerely equipped and consequently less
99
In 1969 an accident occurred aboard the nuclear carrier ENTERPRISE
in which nine large bombs, the explosive equivalent of about six conven-
tional warhead anti-ship missiles exploded on her flight deck. She
reportedly could have resumed operations "in a matter of hours." See W. V.
Whidden, "The Case for the Carrier," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , 97
No. 7 (July 1971), 24-33.
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expensive. It would carry a mix of 20-24 helicopters and vertical/short
takeoff and landing (VSTOL) jets. The helos would provide an extended
reconnaissance and surveillance range and would be equipped to detect and
attack submarines. The jets, probably British Harriers initially, would
be capable of limited air defense of the SCS and its consorts and attack
missions against sea and land targets.
A presence force including one or more of these vessels would have a
credible military capability vis a vis Soviet forces as presently consti-
tuted, yet would not expose an attack carrier to the hazard of a Soviet
first strike. The concept will be tested using an existing amphibious
assault ship (helicopter carrier) beginning in January 1972. If the test
confirms the utility of the SCS the Navy hopes to begin construction of the
first ship in FY 1974 and have it ready for sea in 1978. According to
Admiral Zumwalt the SCS cannot replace the attack carrier and should not
be considered in this light. This is because its smaller size and the
performance limitations of VSTOL aircraft would deny the SCS both the num-
bers and types of aircraft needed to successfully attack shore targets
defended by the sophisticated missiles and aircraft possessed by the
Russians and Soviet aid recipients such as Cairo and Hanoi. Its intended
use, stated the CNO, is to provide air power for "... convoy escort or
open ocean support of small task groups" and also for "... probing
adversary forces for the purpose of determining intentions without increased
risk to the CVs and CVAs [attack carriers] in a confrontation situation."
R. A. Dobkin, "Low-Priced Minicarrier Facing Test," Seattle Post-
Intelligencer
,
December 27, 1971, p. A8.
Speech at the Test Pilot Symposium, Naval Air Station Patuxent
River, Maryland, quoted in "Sea Control Ship Details Given," Navy Times
,
June 9, 1971, p. 32.
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The building program proposed by the American Navy to replace the more
than one-third of its escort vessels which are over twenty years old re-
flects the twin needs to protect the carriers and to develop "... escorts
having a hard punch but which do not individually constitute a high per-
centage of our total capability" for use as presence and "sea control"
102
forces. The DE-1052 class ocean escorts, of which some 46 have been
authorized and funded, are built from the keel up for ASW and have demon-
strated a tremendously increased capability to detect submarines at long
range. The SPRUANCE class destroyer, of which nine of a projected fifty
vessels were funded in the FY 1972 budget, incorporates the same greatly
improved equipment. The ASW strength of these and other escorts is being
increased by providing them with helicopters which will enable them to
attack submarines at longer ranges and at less risk to themselves than has
been possible before. These LAMPS (Light Airborne Multipurpose System)
helos will also provide an improved defense against antiship missiles. A
third ship type, still in the design stage, is the patrol frigate. This
vessel would be smaller than either the ocean escorts or the SPRUANCE
destroyers and is intended to fill the need for relatively large numbers
of capable but less technically sophisticated ships to protect the fleet
supply train, amphibious assault groups, and other groups not including
attack carriers. The Navy would like to have fifty patrol frigates and
103Congress will be asked to provide initial funding in 1972. In addition
a type of hydrofoil missile-armed patrol craft is under development, along
with an anti-ship missile, and Admiral Zumwalt proposes that these "...
102
Admiral Zumwalt, speech to the Cleveland Chapter of the American
Ordnance Association, January 27, 1971.
p. 36.
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will trail enemy missile ships operating within missile range of our major
104
units and will attack them if they attack our ships."
As of 1971 the naval construction program continued to provide for the
slow growth of the nuclear powered surface fleet, a development which the
Russians have apparently eschewed thus far. The ENTERPRISE is to be
joined in September 1973 by the NIMITZ and in June 1975 by the EISENHOWER.
The Department of Defense sought funds in the FY 1972 budget, as it had
unsuccessfully in the two preceding years, for a fourth nuclear carrier,
which if approved in the FY 1973 budget would not be completed until 1980.
In addition to the nuclear powered missile cruiser and two frigates
presently in service, two more of the latter are building and are scheduled
to be placed in service in 1972 and 1973 respectively. The Navy feels that
four such vessels will be required as escorts for each of the nuclear
carriers. Congress appropriated full funds for two more nuclear frigates
in the FY 1971 budget, and provided partial funding for three additional
ships of this type. According to the CNO these nuclear powered carriers
and their escorts are needed to fill". . . the role of a strategic con-
tingency force with which to react to international emergency situations"
in the light of the planned reduction of American forces based overseas
104
CNO Posture Statement, p. 41.
Russian experience with the nuclear powered icebreaker LENIN, the
announced forerunner of a fleet of similar vessels which have never
appeared, may have influenced them against the concept. LENIN was
apparently withdrawn from service in 1967, leading some Western observers
to suspect propulsion difficulties. See David Fairhall, Russian Sea Power
(Boston, 1971), pp. 32-34. In any event it is likely that Soviet nuclear
shipbuilding facilities have been filled to capacity by submarine con-
struction requirements.








In the field of undersea warfare the American program reflects an in-
tent to continue to maintain the deterrent force of POLARIS submarines at
a level of 41 vessels, but to convert 31 of these to the 3000 mile range
POSEIDON missile. Authorized and funded additions to the nuclear powered
attack submarine force, probably the best weapon platform for ASW, stood
at 25 as of March 1971. Of these 12 were of the SSN-688 class, intended
to ". . . help offset the speed advantage currently held by the newer
108
classes of Soviet submarines." The first 688s will not reach the fleet
before 1975.
It should be noted that most of the vessels discussed above are pro-
posed future acquisitions. The strength of the American Navy continued to
decline in 1971. Since 1965 the U.S. Navy was reduced by 25% of its ships
and 20% of its combat aircraft. Navy officials have calculated that in
order to replace the 1971 level of naval forces on an orderly basis, based
on a 25 year ship life cycle, the nation must invest three billion dollars
at 1972 prices each year. This level has not been approached in the past
eight years. One of the many indirect costs of the Vietnam war has been,
109in Admiral Zumwalt's words, ". . .a whole generation of shipbuilding."
In sharp contrast to this the Soviet shipbuilding program has been
in high gear for the last decade, turning out some 200 naval vessels, 1960-
1971. This upward trend in Soviet naval strength shows no sign of
CN0 Posture Statement, p. 48.





Address by Admiral Zumwalt, St. Louis, Missouri, October 14, 1971.
CN0 Posture Statement, p. 8.
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leveling off. In 1970 western analysts estimated Russian naval construc-
tion expenditure at the all-time high of $3 billion. In 1971 primary
emphasis appeared to be placed upon the rapid increase of the Soviet
ballistic missile submarine force. Its growth rate is such that Secretary
Laird, after having predicted in March 1971 that the Soviets would equal
the number of U.S. POLARIS submarines by 1974, was led in October to advance
112
that date to 1973. A new 3,500 mile missile to be launched from these
submarines, designated SAWFLY by NATO observers, was reportedly nearly
113
operational by the end of 1971. The 1971-1972 edition of Jane's Fighting
Ships reported that Russia was completing nuclear submarines at the rate of
one every other month and in May Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, head of the
American Navy's nuclear propulsion program, told Congress that he expected
the Soviet Navy to have 50% more nuclear submarines than the U.S. Navy by
1975.
114
Although the submarine seems to have pride of place among Soviet ship
types, development of new surface vessels appears to be continuing also.
Two of a new type of 7000 ton missile-armed cruiser, dubbed the KRESTA II
class to denote their apparent derivation from the KRESTA class of 1964
vintage, were first observed by Westerners in 1971. Also sighted for the
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But the most important recent development concerning Russian naval
forces concerns a ship which is only about half completed. On the Black
Sea coast, in Nicolayev's Marti Shipyard, a large hull is growing which
exhibits the distinctive characteristics of an aircraft carrier. After
nearly two years of observation Pentagon intelligence analysts announced
in January 1972 that the vessel, which they think will be completed in
1974, appeared to be a carrier in the 20,000-30,000 ton range, slightly
smaller than the U.S. Navy's World War II vintage ESSEX class. If the
ship is indeed an aircraft carrier it is the first definite manifestation
of an extremely significant change in Soviet naval strategy. Said Robert
W. Herrick, who in 1964 wrote a book outlining the essentially defensive
nature of this strategy, "it could be an event of historic significance
that would change the entire nature of Soviet naval strategy."
In making an overall comparison of the American and Soviet navies one
must avoid the temptation to let numbers of ships, construction rates, and
comparative weapon ranges speak for themselves, for the picture which
emerges from a quantitative comparison unleavened by other factors is mis-
leading. One must consider the ability of each navy to meet its nation's
military commitments and support other aspects of foreign policy within the
context of the international situation as viewed from America and Russia.
From this perspective it becomes apparent that the naval needs of the
Soviet Union and the United States differ in significant respects. The
former has the longest coastline of any nation, over 66,000 miles of it,
William Beecher, "Soviets Build A Big Ship—Might Be A Carrier,"
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
,
January 18, 1972, p. Al.
Time magazine, January 31, 1972, p. 28.
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and. this is coupled with great concern for the security of these maritime
borders. In addition Russia faces NATO members across the narrow span of
the Baltic and Black Sea, while across the Sea of Japan that once and
possibly future formidable naval power must be regarded as a potential
danger. The large numbers of coastal escort vessels, short-range sub-
marines, and fast patrol boats possessed by the Soviet Navy reflect the
fact that coastal defense and border security are major requirements for
Russia. The American Navy faces no such requirement, developments in
Cuba notwithstanding, and so has allocated almost all its resources to
large ocean-going warships.
Geography has another effect upon the Soviet Navy, and this is of
course its lack of ports with assured access to the open oceans. Of
similar derivation is the. fact that the bases of the four Soviet Fleets
are widely separated. The former condition means that in planning for
naval contingencies the Russians must contend with the "worst case" situa-
tion in which one or more of their Fleets might be bottled up in its
home waters or that deployed units might be unable to return to their
bases for repair and resupply purposes. The separation of their naval
forces makes the exchange of ships between them relatively time-consuming
and potentially hazardous. Soviet naval planners must either develop
four balanced Fleets, which may require some expensive redundancy of ship
types, or run the risk that sufficient flexibility may not be available
within a given Fleet to enable it to meet the requirements of an unexpected
situation.
Geography imposes fewer constraints upon the U.S. Navy, which faces
only two "choke points" which might interfere with the passage of naval
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forces. The Panama Canal seems likely to remain in U.S. hands for the fore-
seeable future and short of nuclear war the odds that it would be closed to
the American Navy are near zero. There is some limitation imposed here
however, because the more modern carriers are too large to transit the
canal. The other bottleneck with which the U.S. Navy must contend is the
Strait of Gibralter, which is not at present controlled by potentially hostile
Powers though the recent unrest in Morocco could lead in this direction.
Because it does not face the threat of naval opposition in its home waters
the American Navy can accept a less than optimum mix of ship types there
and concentrate its resources on maintaining the capability of the deployed
Fleets.
The necessity to provide support for government policy in situations
shorty of war impos.es increasingly similar requirements upon the two navies,
though there remains a considerable difference in magnitude. The large
number of nations with which the United States is militarily allied is too
familiar to require recounting here, and this imposes upon the American
Navy the necessity of maintaining a clear ability to protect sea lines of
communication across huge ocean expanses. Soviet commitments are both fewer
and less explicit, but in order to support them the Soviet Navy should
manifest a sea control capability between Russia and Cuba, India, North
Vietnam, and Egypt as a minimum. Both navies can anticipate assistance
from allied navies under some circumstances, but potential American allies
are stronger naval powers than those who might aid Russia. In addition to
maintaining alliances, both nations seek to influence the policies of govern-
ments throughout the world, and here an impressive, wide-ranging Navy is a
definite asset. A third area of support for national policy in which both
navies are engaged is nuclear deterrence. Here the Soviet Navy faces a
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requirement necessitating a larger commitment of resources than the American
Navy. The future prospect is for the Soviet Union to require more ballistic
missile submarines than the United States, for one can see after scribing
a few arcs upon a map that while American submarines in the western Pacific
could quite feasibly be targeted against either the People's Republic of
China or Asiatic Russia, Russian submersibles on station to deter China
could not reach the United States with their missiles. Within the coming
decade Soviet military planners will face the need for a sea-based deter-
rent force large enough to be maintained within range of both the United
States and China.
The requirements of naval support for national policy in wartime
are best viewed under two headings: general war and limited war. The
probability of general war seems low at present and for the foreseeable
future, assuming that both nations maintain an assured second strike capa-
bility, and the uncertainties involved in constructing a scenario of such
a war are so great that little time will be spent here discussing the
naval aspects of such an occurrence. It appears that neither Navy devotes
a significant amount of resources to preparation for fighting a nuclear
war other than in its opening phase, where the problems associated with
attack by and defense against ballistic missile submarines receive a great
deal of attention. Each navy can support its nation significantly by
developing the ability to locate and maintain contact with the other's
ballistic missile submarines, and in the Soviet case American carriers as
"General war" refers to an all-out Soviet-American conflict;
"limited war" encompasses conflicts below this level of violence.
\
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well, though the strategic nuclear role of these ships appears now to be of
118
secondary importance.
In viewing the naval requirements of limited war we might usefully
consider two general situations: those in which superpowers Russia and
America might find themselves in direct opposition and those in which either
superpower is in conflict with a lesser Power. In the first category one
might find a limited Soviet incursion into Western Europe or perhaps another
round in the Arab-Israeli fighting which escalated; in the second a Sino-
Soviet or Sino-American war, or superpower intervention in some local con-
flict not involving the other directly. Those areas in which the first
category of conflict has seemed to be worthy of consideration in recent
years—Europe, the Middle East, Vietnam, the Indian subcontinent—are all
relatively closer to the Soviet Union than the United States and would
require less extended sea control efforts of the Soviet Navy than of the
U.S. Navy. Similarly, a war with China would impose less strenuous sea
control efforts upon the Russian Navy than the American. In all of these
circumstances the ability to successfully undertake amphibious landings in
the face of strong opposition would be a major naval contribution to
success.
Solitary superpower intervention might be considered in a variety of
Third World settings and could impose both limited sea control and projec-
119
tion requirements upon either navy. The advent of the fast missile-armed
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Secretary Laird's 1971 Defense Report to Congress made no mention of
carriers when discussing strategic nuclear capabilities, but placed them
with conventional forces.
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"Projection" refers to the process of bringing sea-based power to
bear on land, by means of air power or amphibious forces.
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patrol boat has meant that significant defensive naval power can be
acquired for a price within the reach of an increasing number of small
120
nations. Naval forces of either superpower could well find themselves
required to deal with these craft if intervention from the sea was under-
taken. And since even a small air force could wreak havoc with intervening
troops if unopposed, the interventionist would in many cases need the
ability to bring tactical air power to bear from the first moments of the
undertaking.
Looking at the two navies in the foregoing context one arrives at the
following assessment: the Soviet Navy, for all its spectacular growth, is
at present inadequate to fully support Soviet foreign policy. The U.S.
Navy, for all its decline in numbers, is still adequate for the needs of
national policy. If this were a static situation it would be one from
which Americans could take comfort, but it is not. It is instead a
steadily shifting balance, moving in 1971 in the direction of Soviet naval
sufficiency and American naval inadequacy.
The Soviet Navy is engaged in an all-out catchup effort. Adequate for
coastal defense and maritime border security at the beginning of the last
decade, it has like the Soviet economy weathered the disruptive effects of
Premier Khrushchev's pet schemes and idiosyncracies and is today in the
hands of a leadership which either understands the uses of sea power or is
content to leave its development to those who do. But at present the
effects remain: the bulk of the Soviet Navy is comprised of defensive
120
The price may be largely political as in Egypt or purely monetary
as it was in Norway, but between military aid programs and technical inno-
vation the number of these craft around the world is increasing.
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forces—short-range, diesel powered submarines, small frigates, and fast
patrol craft. This is changing, but at the moment the offensive power of
the Russian Navy is not adequate to meet the demands which may be placed
upon it by Soviet foreign policy.
Measuring the Soviet navy against the tasks incumbent upon it
—
coastal defense/border security, sea control, nuclear deterrence, limited
war, influence projection, and intervention—reveals major limitations:
1) Insufficient numbers of ballistic missile submarines.
2) Inability to control the sea lines of communication to most
Soviet commitment areas in the face of the opposition which can be brought
to bear by its foremost potential naval adversary.
3) Inability to make opposed amphibious landings in support of a
limited war, in areas other than those adjacent to Soviet/East European
borders and in the Eastern Mediterranean.
A) Marginal capability for intervention.
Taking each of these in turn,, we note first of all that though the
question of "how much is enough?" in the area of deterrence is a largely
subjective question, it does appear that if the United States has felt
for some years that a total of 41 POLARIS submarines was re-
quired for deterrence of the Soviet Union alone, it is likely that the
roughly 17 vessels of this type operated by the Soviets as of March 1971
would not be considered adequate by the Kremlin to deter both the United
States and China. The furious pace of Soviet "Y" class submarine construc-
tion is clear evidence that the Russians consider the present force in-




In the area of sea control lack of sea-based air power Is the critical
Soviet deficiency. Without it the surface warships which are necessary
to protect the movement of cargo vessels across the seas cannot long sur-
vive in areas where the opponent's aircraft can reach. Though land-based
aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean could perhaps offset this dis-
advantage with regard to the Soviet position in Egypt, the Soviet Navy could
not support the Russian commitments to Cuba, North Vietnam, and India.
This same deficiency governs in regard to amphibious operations in a
limited war environment, except in Soviet home waters and in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
The Soviet Navy's intervention capability is marginal because of the
inability of a Soviet intervention squadron to control the air, and be-
cause of the proliferation of the very craft which a Russian client state
brought forcefully to the attention of the world, the missile patrol boat.
The difficulty of dealing with these elusive targets by means of the Soviet
force of seagoing missile ships would probably be great because of the
missile guidance problems associated with attacking such a small, fast,
waterborne target and because of the probability that these craft could
approach undetected. As was demonstrated in the Tonkin Gulf on the few
occasions after 1964 when North Vietnamese torpedo boats made forays along
the coast, the reconaissance and attack capability of sea-based aircraft
represents an extremely effective counter against the fast patrol boat,
but this option is not available to the Soviets at present. However,
against nations who had neither aircraft nor missile boats the Soviet Navy
could support seaborne intervention.
Turning to the U.S. Navy in the light of the tasks it may be required
to perform—sea control, nuclear deterrence, limited war, influence
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projection, and intervention—we note:
1) marginal capability to control the sea lines of communication
to U.S. allies.
2) marginal capability for opposed amphibious landings in a
limited war environment.
The American Navy's sea control forces, according to the CNO's Con-
gressional testimony in March 1971, are at "a lower than prudent level"
and might be unable to meet simultaneous wartime requirements for escort
of convoy, surveillance of ocean areas, interdiction of enemy sea lines of
communication, and offensive operations. Lacking are sufficient shore-
based patrol aircraft to cover any but high-priority areas, sufficient ASW
carrier forces to protect any but the most urgent military convoys, and
sufficient attack submarines to fill all the surveillance stations against
Soviet submarines transiting to patrol areas. The Navy's force of missile
cruisers, frigates, destroyers, and ocean escorts would be fully occupied
in providing protection for the carriers, amphibious forces, and fleet
supply train, leaving only some 35 WW II vintage destroyers from the Naval
Reserve and 9 long-range Coast Guard cutters available for escort of
merchant convoys.
The U.S. amphibious capability is curtailed by the reduced numbers of
aircraft carriers, lack of vessels to lift the force to its destination,
and the dearth of warships mounting heavy-caliber guns for shore bombard-
ment. Admiral Zumwalt assessed the existing carrier force as adequate to
support forces ashore in conflicts within the concept of the Nixon Doctrine
where allies bear primary responsibility for ground combat, and which did
121
CNO Posture Statement, pp. 25-27. This applies to situations short
of full wartime mobilization.
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not involve Soviet or Chinese forces. This margin of adequacy is "drastic-
122
ally reduced" if one considers conflicts involving such forces. Suf-
ficient amphibious assault shipping is available in the active fleet to
allow one division-sized landing with enough remaining to allow a very
small landing elsewhere. This capability, it should be noted, does not
take into account the practice which has been followed for some years of
keeping amphibious forces ready in the Mediterranean, Carribean and western
Pacific areas. These forces would have to be reduced or eliminated entirely
in order to assemble sealift for a division-sized contingency. With the
inactivation of the last of the U.S. Navy's heavy cruisers the major-caliber
guns considered necessary for an assault against a sophisticated shore
defense are lacking.
Twenty-five years after it sailed the oceans unchallenged, flushed
with victory in the greatest sea war in history, the U.S. Navy is in need
of rebuilding. The Soviet Navy, with its novel weapons and gleaming new
warships, i-s not tne cause of American naval disarray, but it is ready and
able to reap the benefits of an unchecked aging process if allowed to do
so.
Starting from a position of great naval inferiority the Russians have
done everything that they can to compensate quickly for their lack of
sea-based tactical air power, which is both exceedingly expensive and time-
consuming to develop fully. Missiles offer a relatively cheap and rapidly
acquired means to extend the striking range of the Soviet Navy into the
realm of that enjoyed by those navies posssessing the aircraft carrier,






Over-the-horizon reach is possible only when another sensor platform—ship,
aircraft, or submarine—has located the target and is able to guide the
missile during the intermediate stage of its flight. This would be quite
difficult except perhaps as a surprise attack. The missiles themselves
can make only one attack, and cannot be recalled or exercise judgment
once the attack has been launched. They cannot be kept on airborne alert
as a hedge against surprise. In comparison to the number of attacks
which a carrier may launch without resupply the staying power of the
largest Soviet missile cruiser is insignificant.
The submarine, the other pillar of Soviet naval power, is because of
its elusiveness a superb vehicle for the carriage of nuclear deterrent
weapons, and a highly effective means of denying the use of the sea's sur-
face to others. In comparison to the surface ship it is much better able
to operate beneath a hostile sky. But it cannot secure the use of the
oceans for Soviet vessels because it cannot provide protection against
attack from the air.
The missile-armed Soviet Navy is a first-strike force with the ability
to inflict fatal damage upon the American carrier Navy if it can attain
surprise. Barring success in such an endeavor the survival time of the
KRESTAs and other Soviet missile ships would be days or at most weeks in
a war at sea with the NATO alliance or the United States alone.
The most acute danger to the United States and its allies is not the
military capability of the Soviet Navy but that America may misperceive
that capability, eagerly aided and abetted by the Russians themselves of
course. This danger is that by ballyhooing the submarine and the guided
missile the Soviets may induce the United States to abandon the most
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valuable weapon of conventional naval warfare, and the one in which America
clearly leads all others: the attack carrier, in favor of the newer but
less suitable antiship missile technology in which the Soviets are the
leaders and the United States presently behind. If the Soviet Union can
convince the United States that the maintenance of a modern force of at
least a dozen attack carriers is not worthwhile due to the purported vul-
nerability of surface ships to missile and torpedo attack they will have
pulled off an astounding coup . The Russians observed the susceptibility
of American society to the bold technological bluff
—
perhaps because of
the conditioning effect of countless advertising campaigns touting the
"newer and better"—after Sputnik, although in that instance the apparent
failure of Khrushchev to fully anticipate the results of his rocket-
rattling backfired. His successors are attempting to apply the tactic
again with greater shrewdness.
What must be kept in mind by those charged with formulating American
defense policy is that the submarine and the surface missile ship have not
given the Soviet Union the navy it needs to support its foreign policy and
they will not meet American requirements either.
The United States must not only rebuild its Navy, it must rebuild a
balanced force, one which is equipped to deal with the Russian naval threat
but not straitjacketed by it. The carrier, as the most versatile and
powerful weapon in the arsenal of naval force, must continue to figure
prominently in the American Navy. It must be protected against Soviet
naval weapons by the construction of sufficient numbers of the escort vessels
discussed above. The small, high-speed, missile-armed craft is a useful





the large Russian missile ships honest during a confrontation at sea—and
should be acquired in numbers sufficient to these tasks. The greatest
Soviet military threat to the ability of the United States Navy to support
the foreign policy of the United States is the advanced nuclear submarine.
The threat is one of both numbers and technology and must be met in both
respects by means of ASW ships, submarines and aircraft.

CHAPTER V
SOVIET SEA POWER AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
From the end of the Second World War until the mid-Sixties the West,
and particularly the United States, enjoyed a virtual monopoloy of the
ability to use the sea to project military and economic power to distant
areas in support of foreign policy objectives. This monopoly has been ended
by the Soviet Union's turn to the sea. But more than that, Soviet sea power
poses a challenge of the utmost gravity to the ability of the United States
to attain its basic foreign policy objective: a stable world political
system in which the United States is militarily secure and economically
viable.
The major foreign policy strategy of the nation in the twentieth
century has been to maintain its position as the predominant power in the
Western Hemisphere while encouraging and contributing to a stable balance
of power in Europe and the Far East. Afro-Asia, divided among colonial
powers for most of this century, was dealt with as an extension of the
respective metropolitan powers until the early 1950s. This balance of
power strategy was distorted almost beyond recognition in the first two
decades following World War II, because what emerged was not a system of
Powers but a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The situation was further complicated by the rhetoric, largely moralistic
and/or anti-Communist, in which United States foreign policy was clothed.
To compound the confusion Afro-Asia rapidly emerged as a region which had
to be dealt with on the basis of a multitude of weak and often conflicting
sovereignties.
Developments which matured during the 1960s have brought the postwar
era of international relations, and hopefully the distortion of the American
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balance of power strategy, to an end. The recovery of Europe, the economic
boom of Japan, the tremendous upsurge of nationalism in Afro-Asia and the
instability of the majority of those new nations, the successful assertion
of full sovereignty by China, and the tremendous increase in Soviet national
power and global influence are the major factors which underlie the inter-
national environment of the 1970s. To this must be added the apparent un-
willingness of the citizens of the United States, who remain the ultimate
arbiters of American foreign policy, to support a strategy which calls for
the maintenance of significant numbers of American troops and bases around
the the world and their employment as the main military support of regional
stability.
There is at present much talk of a "new multipolarity" in international
relations, with five major Powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Western
Europe, China, and Japan. This in fact anticipates reality, and hopefully
at that. As a result of the manner in which World War II was concluded two
of these Powers, Japan and Western Europe, are economically powerful but
militarily weak, and of course the latter does not in any real sense yet
present a unified face to the international scene. China is still at least
a generation away from truly crossing the threshold of Great Power status.
Though we are at present experiencing the breakup of the Cold War system,
we have not yet arrived at a stable new multipolar system.
It is my belief that in seeking a stable peace United States Foreign
policy must take into account three overriding factors of the present inter-
national environment:
The imperative to avoid nuclear war and thus situations which enhance
its probability—nuclear Power military confrontations, the proliferation
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of nuclear armed nations, and sudden shifts in the Soviet-American nuclear
balance.
The volatility of Afro-Asia, where extreme nationalism, tremendous
mass pressures for a better life, and weak governments are a constant
source of turmoil. Coupled with this is a growing Soviet military involve-
ment in the affairs of that region.
The inability of the United Nations to act quickly to prevent or snuff
out open warfare in Afro-Asia when the interests of the permanent Security
Council members are in conflict.
122
As indicated by the President's annual foreign policy reports the
strategy by which the United States seeks to move through the transition
period from bipolarity to effective multipolarity appears to be as follows:
In Europe ; To maintain the stable regional system which has evolved
since World War II by 1) respecting Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe
and making no effort to disturb it, and 2) by continuing the Western
security system which balances Soviet power in Europe but on the basis of
greater European organizational initiative and conventional military force,
while maintaining the nuclear guarantee.
In the Western Hemisphere : To maintain the stable regional system
through a revitalized network of interamerican political and economic co-
operation, extending to Cuba and Chile if they act in accordance with the
basic premises of the system, mutual noninterference in domestic affairs
and opposition to the intrusion of non-Hemispheric Powers.
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In the Pacific : To foster the growth of regional stability by 1)
recognizing China's right to realize her potential as a Great Power if she
can do so without making war on her neighbors, withdrawing American mili-
tary forces from the lands on China's perimeter, and by not obstructing a
negotiated return of Taiwan to mainland control; and by 2) encouraging and
supporting new regional security and development assistance arrangements
among Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore, and Malaysia while honoring previous treaty commitments and
providing a nuclear shield under which Japan and Australia will remain
willing to forego the development of nuclear weapons. Both American troop
deployments and financial contributions to existing security arrangements will
be decreased to reflect the growth of regional strength.
Afro-Asia : To minimize both the internal and external effects of
regional instability by seeking to keep it free from Great Power rivalry by
ending American military involvement there and inducing the Soviet Union to
do the same.
Soviet-American Relations : To produce a stable military relationship
at the strategic nuclear level, reach an agreed-upon framework for security
in Europe, attain a mutually acceptable settlement of the Middle East
situation, and by demonstrating that Russian exacerbation of such regional
conflicts will not bring gains worthy of the risks and expense involved in-
duce the Soviets to join the United States in refraining from military com-
mitments to nations caught up in Afro-Asian rivalries.
This is a breath takingly ambitious policy, and one could easily write
a book in the attempt to anticipate all the problems to be dealt with and
their possible solutions. The intent here is much more limited. It seems
indisputable that to successfully follow the strategy outlined above the
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United States must possess the ability to influence the course of events
in each of the regions noted. It is abundantly clear from historical ex-
perience that military power is an indispensible component of national
influence, if it is to be exercised in a sustained and purposeful manner
over a large area. What is proposed in this analysis is that in the inter-
national environment in which United States foreign policy must be con-
ducted, the ability of the Navy to assure American use of the seas is a
sine qua non of the effective exercise of military power and that because
of this the Soviet Navy represents a critical threat to the achievement of
the international system sought by the United States.
Necessary both for the evolution of stable regional systems with
lessened American military presence and to the sought-after pattern of
Great Power military disengagement in Afro-Asia is a reassessment of the
large number of military commitments undertaken by the United States since
World War II. It is necessary that this process, which will involve
adjustments in the tangible expression of United States support, such as
overseas troops and bases, be accomplished on an orderly, controlled basis
to avoid creating instability in Europe or increasing it in the Pacific
and Afro-Asia. As the burden of providing security shifts regional confi-
dence will be crucial, and the critical component of a mood of confidence
will be the manifest ability of the United States to support regional
security interests if regional power falters. If the nations which are
being told that they must assume the major local responsibility for their
own defense feel that a single slip on their part may bring disaster they
will not make thre transition successfully and the withdrawal of regional
American military power will leave in its wake the same unstable situations
which have twice in this century combined with expanding authoritarian
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states to produce world war. (One might note at this juncture that it is
in regard to this need for regional confidence in the prospect of American
support if required that the manner of American disengagement from Indo-
china and the situation left there is of crucial importance.)
It is the ability of the United States to nurture the necessary
atmosphere of regional confidence which is most directly affected by Soviet
naval power. In an era when the United States no longer enjoys the over-
whelming strategic nuclear superiority that it once did American military
forces in this category are not sufficient by themselves to elicit confidence
in American support if needed. The American guarantee of nuclear defense
remains a crucial component but it cannot be the sole or even the primary
basis of regional conficence. Because all the nuclear powers (and hope-
fully the present group will not be enlarged) recognize the overwhelming
need to avoid nuclear war, it is in the realm of conventional military
force that the military influence upon diplomacy will rest. It is an in-
escapable result of geography that any American employment of such forces
in Europe or the Pacific rests upon the ability of the United States to
move large quantities of materiel if not the men themselves, across two
of the world's great oceans. The Soviet Navy, with its emphasis on sub-
marines and anti-ship missiles, is aimed squarely at blocking this
critical requirement.
The significance of this is not lost upon Western Europeans. Wrote
a Frankfurter Rundschau columnist in 1970:
For two years or so Western military men have been
seriously alarmed by the rapid development of Soviet
naval power. Of late the alarm has reached panic pro-
portions. . . . Soviet naval power is aimed at a
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distince gap in NATO strategy. . . . Transatlantic supply
lines are... NATO's Achilles heel. 123
SALT, Ostpolitik , the 1971 Four-Power Berlin treaty, movement toward
convening a European security conference and the possibility of mutual
NATO-WTO force reductions, the enlargement of the Common Market to ten
nations including Great Britain, continuing Sino-Soviet tensions, and the
American debate on unilateral troop reductions all promise to create in the
near future the greatest change in East-West relations in Europe since the
onset of the Cold War. It will take a careful blend of military disengage-
ment and the plausible assurance of support from the United States if the
result is to be compatible with the large framework of American foreign
policy, a unified Western defense arrangement in which the United States
need be no more than an equal partner below the strategic nuclear level to
maintain a stable' balance of power. Serious lack of confidence that the
United States Navy could control the Atlantic sea lines of communication
in the face of conventional Soviet naval opposition would make this objec-
tive unattainable.
As described in Chapter III an expansionist Soviet foreign policy in
the Third World will be a feature of the international environment. If
Great Power rivalries are indeed to be muted in Afro-Asia the United States
must be able to show the Russians that the game is not worth the candle.
Naval power has a critical role to fill in this process, as events in the
Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent have demonstrated.
Though Europe is in flux it is stable indeed in comparison to the
Middle East, where the United States has an important, even vital interest
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6, 1970, p. 2.
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in preventing Soviet domination of that area because unfettered access to
its oil is crucial to the development of Western Europe and Japan as inde-
pendent power centers. Here the American contribution to maintaining the
precarious balance between the Arab states and Israel consists of prevent-
ing a decisive shift against the Israelis, mainly by discouraging direct
Soviet military intervention and by selling Israel sufficient advanced
weapons to maintain its security in the face of Soviet arms shipments to
the radical Arab states. Because both the United States and the Soviet
Union are deeply involved a shift in the balance of power which seriously
threatened the survival of either Israel or the UAR could bring the super-
powers into direct and explosive confrontation.
Such a shift threatened to occur in September 1970, and the interplay
of the Soviet and American navies in the Eastern Mediterranean during that
crisis is illustrative both of the importance of naval superiority to the
attainment of United States foreign policy objectives and the increasingly
precarious nature of that superiority in 1970. During the critical phase
of an attempt by the Government of Jordan to break the autonomous power of
the Pales tinean guerrilla movement operating from within its borders, Syrian
tanks crossed into Jordan and attacked Jordanian forces. Control of the
country was at stake, and with it the Middle East ceasef ire ,for if Jordan
were to come under either Syrian or Palestinean control this sudden shift
of the regional balance against Israel would almost certainly have produced
a major renewal of the fighting. As President Nixon later put it,
With the Soviet Union so deeplv involved in the military
operations of the UAR, and with firm U.S. sunoort for Israel,
the risk of a great-power confrontation would have been real,
indeed. 124
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The United States Government took a firm stand against Syrian inter-
vention, underlining it with the only instrument of American military power
immediately available, the Sixth Fleet. Its forces were ordered to move
into the Eastern Mediterranean to positions about 200-250 miles from
125
Amman. No assistance was forthcoming from other NATO navies. A large
Soviet naval force, including seven vessels armed with anti-ship missiles,
moved with the American carrier groups while the Soviet Government vigor-
ously condemned Jordan's position. Three factors differed significantly
from those of the military situation in 1967: Soviet strategic nuclear
parity, tending toward superiority, a much stronger Soviet naval presence,
not a discreet distance as in 1967 but within missile range of the carriers
and the greatly increased tactical air support available to the Soviet
Navy from airfields in the UAR. With two attack carriers in the
Mediterranean the United States did not have clearcut local military
superiority in the face of possible Soviet opposition to military measures
in support of the Government of Jordan. A third attack carrier and other
reinforcements were hurriedly deployed from the United States and their
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arrival gave the Sixth Fleet definite local military superiority, ' but
until then the military equation, and thus the effectiveness of the
American Government's attempt to maintain the regional balance by appearing
willing and able to employ force if necessary and to do so successfully,
was in doubt. President Nixon subsequently characterized this crisis, from
which the Hussein government emerged in full control of the country after
Syrian forces withdrew and the guerrillas were defeated, as ". . . the
127
gravest threat to world peace since this administration came into office."
Russia is active in seeking to expand its influence into the oceanic
heart of Afro-Asia, the Indian Ocean basin. The Soviet Union is heavily
involved in the attempted manipulation of internal and external political
rivalries in this region: In Somalia, where the Soviet-trained and
equipped Army seized power in a coup in 1969, in the Sudan, where a similar
coup was attempted against President Numeiry a few months after he declared
his intention to destroy the Sudanese Communist Party, in the People's
1 ?fi
To the man on the spot, Vice Admiral Kidd, the arrival of the
additional carrier group "... was like the sun coming up in the middle
of the night." Ibid
. ,
p. 25. Unfortunately, this happy ending does not
complete the story. Meeting the requirements of this situation placed a
tremendous strain upon both ships and men of the depleted Atlantic Fleet.
The third carrier, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, was only halfway through with a
training period which began x^ith 70% of her crew newly arrived on board.
After she was sent to the Mediterranean only two other attack carriers,
both with untrained crews as a result of shipyard overhaul periods , were
available in the Atlantic Fleet. The President's subsequent decision to
maintain three attack carriers in the Mediterranean, the number apparently
required for politically effective naval superiority, tied up nearly half
the attack carriers available. In addition, the decision to send addi-
tional amphibious forces to the Sixth Fleet left the Caribbean without the
Amphibious Ready Group normally kept there for training and contingencies.
James N. Hannan, "Its Time To Stop the Downhill Skid," Navy
,
13 No. 11
(November 1970), p. 101.
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Republic of Yemen (Soutern Yemen) , from whence a guerilla movement is
embroiled with neighboring sheikdoms, and on the Indian subcontinent.
A sustained extension of Soviet power to this area would be threaten-
ing to both the Chinese Peoples Republic and Japan and could prevent the
development of a stable regional situation in the Pacific without a large
American military presence. Here again naval power is America's only ef-
fective military lever for influencing events, as was illustrated in
December 1971 when the Indo-Pakistani rivalry broke into large-scale
fighting again.
When it appeared that India, buttressed by the recently completed
Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation with the Soviet Union, might
go beyond the limited objective of separating East Pakistan and seek by
destroying the bulk of Pakistan's armed forces to reduce that state to
helplessness and probable disintegration, a naval squadron including
nuclear carrier ENTERPRISE and an amphibious force of 2,000 Marines was
ordered into the Bay of Bengal as one facet of an American diplomatic
effort to dissuade India from such a step. Once again the superpower
military equation was worked out in the capitals concerned and this time
the local factors were firmly in American favor: with neither a strong
naval presence nor tactical air cover Soviet military strength in the
area was insufficient to blunt the implied threat of American intervention.
After the introduction of the American naval force a ceasefire was arranged
through the United Nations, four previous attempts having failed.
It would be incorrect, especially with so little information available
at the present time, to assert that it was solely due to the presence of
the American task force that the fighting ceased after Dacca surrendered.
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But it is clear that if the United States Government had been unable to
dispatch such a force swiftly to the crisis area immediate American diplo-
matic leverage would have almost disappeared, and with it the ability to
do more than issue expressions of regret as the Russians vetoed Security
Council ceasefire resolutions and the Government of India cooly ignored
world opinion as expressed by the General Assembly.
In addition to reemphasizing the lesson of the 1970 Jordan crisis,
this conflict provides an illustration of the value of nuclear propulsion
for naval forces which may have to react quickly to developments in dis-
tant areas. Had ENTERPRISE required frequent refueling as oil-burning
carriers do, the task of maintaining the force in the Indian Ocean for the
necessary month would have been much more difficult. As it happened in
this particular case there would have been oilers available on relatively
short notice because of the standing American naval presence in the nearby
Tonkin Gulf and South China Sea. As this decade progresses such fortunate
coincidences will become much less likely as the permanent American over-
seas presence decreases, and it would significantly increase the time neces-
sary to bring such a carrier force to the scene if it was limited by the
1 no
speed of even the fastest oilers. The fact that the arrival of
ENTERPRISE quickly established local American naval superiority in an area
where the standing Soviet naval presence had overshadowed a smaller American
force for most of the three previous years underlined the fact that the
maintenance of a continuous presence is only one aspect of naval power's
128
In addition, it takes more than a single oiler to provide enough
fuel to keep an oil-burning carrier task force on some oceanic station.
A chain of oilers reaching back to the nearest source of fuel is required,
and these in their turn must be fueled and protected. When considered
against these and other "hidden costs" of an oil-burning carrier fleet




capability, one which may be outweighed by the ability of another nation
to rapidly move superior forces to a crisis area and keep them there as
long as necessary.
Given the international environment of the 1970s as previously
described it seems virtually certain that situations such as those recounted
here will be repeated. If the present trend in the Soviet-American naval
relationship continues, Soviet ability to take local military action to
successfully thwart such use of American naval power will become such that
the probability that they will do so renders American action prohibitively
risky. The ability of the United States to exercise the influence required
to successfully conduct its foreign policy strategy outlined previously
would be so reduced as to virtually eliminate the chance of success.
But the threat posed by the Soviet Navy to American foreign policy
is even graver than that. If Soviet technological and quantitative naval
growth rates continue to exceed those of the United States it is probable
that before the end of this decade they will seek a naval confrontation
outside of the NATO area such that the United States Navy alone can be
visibly challenged on the issue "Is the United States able to control the
sea routes to areas of her interest and commitment?" Either by forcing the
United States to withdraw in the face of Soviet power or by dealing a limited
but sharp defeat to American naval forces they would expect to reveal the
129
weakness of American military power below the strategic nuclear level.
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Admiral Zumwalt expressed concern over this possiblity in a speech
in St. Louis, Missouri in October 1971. For a non-military view of such an
event, though one which overstates the difficulty of the ASW problem, see
Paul Cohen, "The Erosion of Surface Naval Power," Foreign Affairs , 49 No.
2 (January 1971), pp. 330-341. Cohen observes that the effect upon
America will could be shattering. I personally feel that it would make the
effect of the Vietnam experience look like a ripple in comparison.
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This would destroy not only American hopes to estahlish regional stability
in the Pacifc and to eventually insulate Afro-Asia from Great Power rivalry,
it would destroy the Atlantic Alliance as well. Only by redeploying its land
and air forces overseas, and probably not even then, could the United States
prevent "... the voluntary peaceable acceptance of a new political order
130
in the world under Soviet leadership."
Seen through Russian eyes such a scenario gives and interesting, if
necessarily speculative, insight into the discrepancy between present
Soviet naval capabilities and the requirements of Soviet foreign policy
indicated in Chapter IV. The commitments which now are out of phase with
with the state of Soviet naval development are not in fact a part of the
preferred Soviet foreign policy strategy at present but were improvised
attempts to stave off undesireable developments, or were like Cuba an un-
welcome legacy from Khrushchev. The Soviet Treaty of Friendship with Egypt
came on the heels of President Sadat's purge of pro-Soviet government
officials and military officers. The treaty with India was the quid pro
quo of an attempt which later failed to induce the Indian Government not
to precipitate open war with Pakistan—which the Indians were for their
own reasons determined to do.
The Soviets have limited resources to devote to naval construction
and in addition their Navy lacks experience and training in the carrier
operations required for the projection and sea control roles. It would
take not only rubles but a period of 10-12 years to develop a carrier force
which could hope to successfully carry out such operations in the face of
the conventional naval opposition which could be offered by the United States
130
Marshall Shulman. Cf page 55 above.
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But the United States is the only nation with the combination of existing
naval forces, experienced seamen and the necessary economic slrength to
remain ahead of the Russians if they build the Navy for the projection and
sea control role that their overall strategy of expanding Soviet influence
demands. They are therefore first concentrating their resources on the task
of eliminating the U.S. Navy as a force with which they must contend when
they turn to the projection and sea control task that they ultimately must
surmount if Russia is to expand. At the same time they are making prepara-
tions for this role by constructing first vessels which can operate heli-
copters and VSTOL aircraft, the LENIN and the MOSKVA, and also by building
131
a small attack carrier, all the while decrying the very viability of the
idea in the nuclear missile age.
If this strategy works in all respects by the time the morale of the
U.S. Navy and the will of the United States to act as a Great Power have
been destroyed in the naval confrontation postulated above, the Russian
Navy would have a fledgling carrier force which in the drastically changed
international climate following the American debacle would be capable of
fully supporting Soviet foreign policy because it would not be challenged
by the United States. On the other hand if it were to fail the penalties
would not be severe—a setback but not a disaster.
Little has been said in this chapter about the impact of the Soviet
merchant fleet's far-flung activities upon United States foreign policy
because their weight is largely indirect, as an asset to the Russians but
not a direct threat to the United States or the other Western seafaring
nations and Japan. It fills the Soviet need for seaborne transportation,
Cf. page 81 above.
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provides foreign exchange, on occasion provides logistic support to the
Navy, increases the Soviet presence throughout the world and serves as a
highly visible manifestation of the promise of the Soviet model of economic
development, and provides the necessary controlled carriage of military
equipment to clients of the military assistance program. It does not have
either the present capacity or the projected growth potential to mount a
direct political attack upon the United States and its major allies as is
sometimes suggested by driving their merchant fleets out of business and
thus denying them the assured carriage of the strategic materials and trade
necessary to sustain their economies. It could, however, do severe economic
damage to members of an individual liner conference by engaging in sustained
price undercutting if the Soviet Government saw some net gain in doing that.
To date Soviet pricing behavior has not been significantly different from
that of Western shipowners, though they have at times raised the specter of
the relatively larger capital resources at their disposal to get concessions
from liner conferences.
The United States needs not so much to "keep up with the Russians" or
adopt other maritime policies in reaction to existing Russian merchant
activities as to recognize its own needs for merchant shipping and take
steps to see that they are met. These are, briefly, to have sufficient
numbers and types of cargo vessels to serve as a naval auxiliary in the
deployment and support of land and air forces which might be required
overseas for some limited war contingency and to have a large enough U.S.
flag fleet to assure the controlled carriage of strategic materials if
necessary. Because of recent trends in merchant vessel construction there
is a shortage of some types of ships for the first requirement, but it can
be overcome with a relatively modest government expenditure. The Merchant
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Marine Act of 1970, which provided strong economic incentives for United
States shipping companies to purchase 300 new vessels from American ship-
yards in the Seventies and operate them under the U.S. flag, should result
in a revitalization of the flag fleet to insure that the second requirement
can be met.
The events of the next eight to ten years will in all probability
determine the pattern of international relations for the remainder of this
century. If the essential features of the system sought by the United
States are realized, the world will have succeeded in dissipating the ex-
plosive combination of regional instability and Great Power rivalry which
has kept world war or the threat of world war the almost constant companion
of the human race since 1913. By basing its foreign policy not on an
idealized conception of human nature but on the establishment of a truly
multipolar international system in which competing national interests are
accepted as an inescapable feature and can be blunted not only by vetting
in an international forum but as well by shifting combinations of national
alignment in a world where all major powers have a stake in the status quo
and refrain from military involvement in the turbulent affairs of the
colonial succession states, the government in the United States might suc-
ceed in doing in the 1970s what it failed to accomplish by another method
in 1919-1920: make possible a return to some semblance of the relatively
peaceful international environment which prevailed in the century between
the Congress of Vienna and the guns of August. The alternatives are not
pleasant to contemplate in a world where five nations possess nuclear
weapons and numerous others are capable of following suit if they come to
believe that their security requires it.

Ill
The danger that Soviet naval power will be used to prevent the attain-
ment of this goal is acute, not because Russian leaders want war, or be-
cause they are evil men, or because they are stupid—no "devil theories"
need apply—but because the combined pressures of ideology, history, in-
security, and nationalism will keep them on their present course during the
132
critical period through which the world is now passing, when the transi-
tion from a precarious Cold War fostered stability to a less fearful, more
resilient multi-polar stability might be achieved.
The action required of the United States to meet this danger is the
rehabilitation of its aging Navy and the continued purposeful use of this
revitalized force as a diplomatic instrument. The critical and immediate
requirement is a high priority naval construction program—time is short
and the design and construction of modern naval weapons systems and the
development of the new tactics and techniques required to use them effec-
tively is a matter of years rather than months. Such a construction pro-
gram, which is in excess of that requested by the FY 1972 Defense budget,
has been made available to the Congress on an informal, informational basis
133by the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be approved when submitted
formally by the Department if the Russian naval challenge is to be met.
The United States has at present a good framework within which to con-
tinue the diplomatic use of naval power. Certainly the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Far East have been utilized
132
But for the shock administered by the Vietnam experience the same
inertia might apply as well to United States foreign policy.
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The program calls for an expenditure of fifty billion dollars over
a ten year period to produce an all-nuclear submarine fleet of 105 vessels,
the replacement of twelve of the present force of conventionally powered
attack carriers with nuclear carriers ," deployment of a large number of
patrol frigates, and the construction of sea control ships at the rate of
two per year. See Orr Kelly, "Navy Seeks $50 Billion for Ships," The
Washington Star
, September 2, 1971.
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repeatedly in the past as diplomatic instruments. However, the Seventh
Fleet has been largely concentrated in the waters off Vietnam and to a
lesser extent the^ Philippines and Japan since 1965. Efforts must be made
to expand its cruising to appear more widely throughout not only the Far
East but the Indian Ocean as well as soon as the American role in Vietnam
permits this. The Sixth Fleet must be strengthened so that it can remain
visible and impressive in the Mediterranean in spite of rising Soviet naval
and air power in that region.
After a period in which the United States demonstrates to the Russians
that it is willing and able to take the measures necessary to prevent them
from gaining a politically significant advantage from the risky and costly
business of seeking to manipulate regional Afro-Asian disputes, the
premises which one hopes .will lead to the emergence of a concrete modus
vivendi from the SALT may also make possible a mutual reduction of naval
forces in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, or more likely given Soviet
proximity to the latter, a reduction of the Sixth Fleet presence in return
for a Soviet Mediterranean operating pattern which unambiguously indicates
non-involvement in the turmoil of its southern and eastern shores. There
is also a need to increase the combined naval strength of the Atlantic
Alliance in Northern European waters in the face of growing alarm among
those nations, especially Norway and Germany, at the rise of Soviet naval
134
strength there. The making of the American contribution to this process
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No attempt should be made to end Soviet naval predominance in the
Baltic, for this would encroach upon the border security whicb any Great
Power expects to exercise, and would of course be exceptionally de-
stabilizing in the Soviet case. What should be done, however, is to
strengthen the naval forces of the Alliance to the point that its ability
to control the North Atlantic is unmistakable.
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would be eased by a redeployment of warships from the Mediterranean force.
Here again the the characteristics of naval power are uniquely appropriate
to the needs of American foreign policy, for unlike military force based
ashore it can be removed without a trace to facilitate accommodation but
be swiftly returned at full strength if accommodation later fails. It is
this aspect of naval power which could enable the Sixth Fleet to be reduced
under the conditions outlined above without destroying the viability of
NATO's Southern Tier—Italy, Greece, and Turkey— if_ the all-important element
of confidence in American strength and will can be maintained.
If future accommodations between the Soviet Union and Chile or a Soviet
decision to make active use of its naval facilities in Cuba lead to in-
creased Soviet naval operations in the Caribbean and South American waters
the American naval presence will have to be increased there as well. In
such an event the capability to introduce and sustain American naval
forces into the sea basins bordering on the Soviet Union would be necessary
to provide an incentive for mutual forebearance of such tactics.
It has been suggested that the United States undertake initiatives
among its maritime allies to inaugurate additional multinational cruising
squadrons similar to the existing NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic and
establish procedures to pool information regarding Soviet naval activities
with the objective of offsetting their political and psychological impact
135
through the countervailing presence of such squadrons. Such a course
of action would be valuable not only because it would spread the burden
of countering the Soviet turn to the sea among all who should bear it, but
for the favorable impact of multilaterism itself. Such a course would be
most useful in providing "show-the-flag" types of naval influence, but the
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James F. McNulty, "Soviet Sea Power: Ripple or Tidal Wave," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings
, July 1970, p. 23.
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experience of the Six-Day War, the 1970 Jordan crisis, and the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan War indicates clearly that where "show-of-force" influence is
1 ^6
required the United States must be capable of going it alone if necessary.
Even with the employment of such techniques to derive maximum benefit
from existing naval forces the rejuvenation and strengthening of American
naval power will be a costly process, but it must be undertaken, and at
once, if United States foreign policy in the 1970s is to be characterized
both by "no more Vietnams" and by success in shaping an international
environment in which it and other nations which share a belief in the
central importance of individual human liberties can flourish.
Events thus far in the twentieth century indicate that in the long
run there can be neither peace nor security for the United States in the
absence of a more stable world than past policies have succeeded in calling
forth. Present American foreign policy is an attempt to go beyond the
measures required for short run national security to reach the larger goal
of a stable international system. The success of this policy is inseparable
from the ability of the United States to use the oceans of the world to pro-
ject the military force necessary to support other diplomatic efforts. The
maintenance of this ability in the face of Soviet naval power will not of
itself assure the success of American foreign policy—but without it suc-
cess is impossible.
This observation of George Washington, made while the struggle for in-
dependence was still in progress, applies with no less force at present:
IOC
The difficulties involved in arranging for such multilateral action
to meet a sudden crisis were well illustrated by U.S. efforts to assemble a
multinational naval group to put pressure on Egypt to end the blockade of
the Gulf of Aquaba, the act which many feel compelled the Israelis to strike.






"It follows as certain as night succeeds day, that without a decisive
137
naval force we can do nothing definitive. ..."
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Letter to the Marquis de la Fayette, November 15, 1781. Robert




COMMENT ON SOURCE MATERIALS
Any researcher dealing with a topic involving the composition,
disposition and strategic concepts of a military organization must at
times discover himself blocked by considerations of security. In the
case of this paper this was not a serious obstruction with regard to the
military forces of the U.S., but it posed a very significant difficulty
with respect to the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Not only are the
Russians much more reticent concerning such data, but they virtually never
publish such information in consolidated form. The researcher must process
many sources in order to gather and consider information scattered through-
out the Soviet military and political press.
Although I have engaged a great deal of such sifting in the preparation
of this study, as one who lacks a knowledge of the Russian language I must
acknowledge definite limitations in this field. Although a study of the
journal of translations Current Digest of the Soviet Press produced much
which was useful in the preparation of this paper, the articles presented
are the selection of an editorial staff seeking to present a survey of a
wide field and are thus unavoidably less than a complete picture of the
Soviet military press. This caveat must apply as well to the translations
compiled by the U.S. Government's Joint Publications Research Service, al-
though these publications do emphasize military, scientific, and technical





and World Marxist Review
,
all published in
English by the Soviet government.
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The only lengthy treatment of military policy to be published in
the Soviet Union since 1926 is Military Strategy
,
edited by the late
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky. This book was originally
published in the Soviet Union in 1962 and was published in revised editions
in 1963 and 1968. The 1962 edition has been published in English by RAND
and Praeger, and Leon Goure's Notes on the Second Edition of Marshal V.D .
Sokolovskii's "Military Strategy" (RM-3792-PR)
,
published by RAND compares
the two editions. I did not have access to a translation of the 1968
edition.
Because of these limitations considerable use was made of the detective
work of others in preparing this paper. Siegfried Breyer 's Guide to the Soviet
Navy was invaluable as a source of data on the Soviet naval construction
program, Soviet naval bases, the composition of the four main Soviet Fleets.
Information concerning Soviet naval visits was obtained from several sources,
but here, too, I drew heavily on Breyer.
Table I, comparing Soviet and American naval forces, was derived from
a number of sources. Data on the U.S. Navy came from Stefan Terzibaschitsch's
compilation in Naval Review 1971
,
supplemented by the CNO Posture Statement
in the case of air groups and by Jane's Fighting Ships, 1970-1971 with regard
to the composition of air groups and the figure for land-based aircraft.




precedence to the former where conflict occurred. As noted previously,
Secretary Laird's recent Congressional testimony confirmed the order of
magnitude of the data thus derived, but indicated that the Soviets had six




The weapon ranges depicted in figures one and two were derived from
Jane's 1970-71 for the U.S. Navy and Breyer for the Soviet Navy. Data
concerning Soviet weapons elsewhere in the paper are also from Breyer.
Of the large number of studies of Soviet sea power currently available
I found the following works, in addition to that of Breyer, to be most
valuable to me in the preparation of this paper. Gunboat Diplomacy by
James Cable gives a cogent analysis of the ways in which limited naval force
may be used as an arm of diplomacy, based upon a survey of this practice
over the past fifty years. In addition the author devoted a chapter to
examining "the Soviet naval enigma". Russian Sea Power by David Fairhall
is a carefully balanced appraisal of the subject with emphasis upon the
nonmilitary aspects of Russia's maritime efforts. Robert W. Herrick's
Soviet Naval Strategy is the most comprehensive Western study of that sub-
ject, though I believe that events since its publication in 1968 have over-
taken tha author's theory that it is fundamentally defensive in nature.
Thomas W. Wolfe's meticulously documented Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-
1970
,
though not a study of naval developments, gives a thorough assess-
ment of the overall military policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime and its
relationship to foreign policy. Multicrises by Jonathan Trumbull Howe is
a study of naval forces and global politics in the nuclear era which
focuses on the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958 and the Six-Day War. It is
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